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This thesis will first identify how the United States Navy-
plans, programs and budgets for its training conducted en
route between permanent duty stations through its TEMDUINS
(Temporary Duty Under Instruction) program.
There currently seems to be a lack of coordination between
the planning, programming, budgeting and execution of the
Navy's en route training requirements and the dollars needed
to support service members while in school.
Several groups are integral to both the financial and
functional success of Navy's TEMDUINS' program:
• The Warfare Program Coordinators (OP- 02, 03 and 05) , whose
actions generate en route training requirements
• The Chief of Naval Operations (OP- 11) , who establishes and
monitors the resulting training quotas
• The TEMDUINS Program Manager (Bureau of Naval Personnel
(BUPERS) , Pers-203) , whose tasking includes the overall
management of the TEMDUINS program and
• The Resource Sponsor (OP- 120) and Claimant (BUPERS, Pers-
02) who are ultimately responsible for funding the
member's per diem while in training.
Functional separation of these Navy players has the
potential advantages of incorporating actual fleet needs,
projecting requirements due to systems changes and managerial
oversight. In reality, however, this separation has more
frequently led to confusion, disconnects and parochialism.
A lack of cohesive interaction with these Navy offices has
impaired the TEMDUINS program in the past. This is reflected
in the program' s historical funding shortages during the
execution year. In 1977, the program was funded at $6.8
million, and in 1991 $42 million are needed to meet current
requirements [Ref. 1] . Some of the deficiencies can be
attributed to "fact of life" budget cuts from NAVCOMPT
(Comptroller Office of the Navy) . However, many TEMDUINS
funding problems can be traced to internal sources, including:
The Resource Sponsor and Claimant being unaware of
additional training requirements which exceeded TEMDUINS
budget levels.
Emerging TEMDUINS -supported training needs not being
communicated to the Resource Sponsor, Program Manager
and/or Claimant in time for POM (Program Objective
Memorandum) funding.
Absence of a mechanism available to the Navy to track and
quantify TEMDUINS training requirements so as to develop
a comprehensive database. Most critical in such a system
would be the ability to identify savings (i.e., deleting
unused courses and ensuring that offsets are accounted for
as courses phase in and out)
.
Lack of a strong OPNAV policy regarding training
requirements in general, and the relatively lower status
of training as compared to other dollar- intensive Navy
programs. In the face of decreasing defense resources,
Navy can no longer consider all training as "must have."
This thesis will also examine related programs used by the
United States Army, Air Force and Marine Corps to determine
how they manage their en route training activities. The focus
will be on both the mechanics of their respective planning,
programming, budgeting and execution processes, and managerial
interactions and management control procedures used.
B . OBJECTIVE
The requirement to provide en route temporary duty (TDY)
training is not unique to the Navy, but is a requirement
common to all four military services. Each service uses
appropriated Operations and Maintenance funds to centrally
support training for military personnel conducted en route
between permanent duty stations. The funding reaches the
individual service member in the form of per diem in
accordance with the Joint Services Travel Regulation (Section
U4100) . Transportation associated with this type of training
is provided through the member's PCS (Permanent Change of
Station) orders using Military Personnel (MP) funds.
Given this commonality, it should be feasible to do a
comparative analysis among the services to gain an
understanding of alternative ways to manage this activity.
The main thrust of the thesis will be to examine how the Navy
and its sister services plan, program, budget and execute
funding to support en route TDY training. The goal will be to
identify efficiencies or methodologies the Navy can adapt to
better manage the TEMDUINS program and maximize the use of the
program's limited funds.
Additional questions to be researched in this thesis are:
• What factors relating to en route TDY training are common
to all four services and which are unique?
• How do the respective services program for this type of
training in the POM process?
• How are new en route TDY training requirements (i.e.,
those related to an equipment modification or acquisition)
programmed and funded by the services?
• To what level does each service delegate budgeting for
this category of training?
• Are specialized computer or management control systems
used by the services in planning for en route TDY
training?
• What controls are used by the services to maximize the use
of funds during the execution year?
• What are the services' respective management policies
towards this type of training?
C. RESEARCH METHOD
Research for this thesis was conducted in three steps.
First, service documents, directives and papers related to TDY
en route were reviewed to identify documentation of planning,
programming, budgeting or execution procedures. The purpose
of this step was to establish a common base between the
services, if possible. As no data was found, the search was
broadened to financial management control systems, both within
the Department of Defense and in the civilian sector.
Focusing on financial management control systems seemed to be
a natural expansion as it appears to be a factor in the Navy's
problems with the TEMDUINS' program.
The second step was to interview personnel involved with
TDY en route in each of the military services. Through
temporary duty assignments to Washington, D.C., interviews
were conducted with respective Army, Navy, Air Force and
Marine program principals. Questions tendered were aimed to
identify similarities and differences between how Navy and the
other services' management of the TDY en route issue.
Personal interviews were invaluable as it proved easier to
reach a common base for discussion in person than over the
telephone. Also, the author was able to gather additional
directives and research material during these meetings.
The last step was to correlate and integrate the gathered
information to identify recommendations for improving the
Navy's management of the TEMDUINS program. The result of
lessons learned from the analysis of TEMDUINS may also have
potential application to other Navy programs.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of five chapters
Chapter I, Introduction, briefly outlines the focus of
this thesis and familiarizes the reader with the subject of
TEMDUINS and TDY en route training.
Chapter II, Background, describes the present budget
environment for the Operations and Maintenance
appropriation
.
Chapter III, Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution for the Navy's TEMDUINS Program, addresses the
management processes currently used by the Navy in dealing
with this program.
Chapter IV, Variations on a Theme: How Other Services
Manage En Route TDY Training, describes the procedures
followed and controls implemented by the Navy's sister
services for the planning, programming and budgeting of
their TEMDUINS -equivalent programs.
Chapter V, Evaluation of TEMDUINS' Financial Management
Control System, relates the Navy's management of TEMDUINS
to traditional financial management control system theories.
Chapter VI, Conclusions and Recommendations, identifies
the conclusions resulting from research conducted and
recommendations for improvement in the control and financial
management of the TEMDUINS program. Subsidiary questions
for future research topics are also included.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DEFENSE DOLLARS IN TODAY'S FEDERAL BUDGET
"You may blame the War Department for a great many-
things, " General Douglas MacArthur said in 1953, "but you
cannot blame them for not asking for money. That is one fault
to which we plead not guilty." [Ref. 2:p. 84] Things have not
changed greatly since 1953 in that the Department of Defense
(DoD) continues to ask Congress for money. DoD's success has
been tempered, however, by politics and the economy. Defense
dollars used to dominate the federal budget, though their
position has now been usurped by entitlements. These
entitlements, or non- discretionary funds, are mandatory
payments to congressional constituents. Yet, defense spending
still receives the most attention, largely because so much of
it is "discretionary" spending. While the defense
appropriation represents less than 25 percent of the federal
budget, it accounts for more than 75 percent of the federal
government's discretionary funds [Ref. 3:p. 85] . As a result,
DoD is now in the unenviable position of competing for dollars
against the people that put Congress into office, and, since
defense appropriations are discretionary, having the easiest
funds to cut. To survive in this environment, DoD must
maximize its fiscal operations. As noted by Adelman and
Augustine, "In the twenty- first century, dollars and yen may
ultimately be more important than bullets and bombs." [Ref.
3:p. 77]
.
B. INVESTMENT VS. OPERATING BUDGETS
A great deal of emphasis has been placed on DoD and Navy's
procurement budgets for roughly the last 10-15 years. The
investment budget, comprised of Research and Development (R&D)
and Procurement appropriations, dominated the defense budget
in years past.
It is questionable as to whether or not this viewpoint is
still accurate, however. The operating budget, comprised of
Military Pay and Allowances and Operations and Maintenance
appropriations, actually represents a far larger share (60
percent) of the 1991 defense budget than the investment budget
did. Further, the Military Pay and Allowances (29 percent)
and the Operations and Maintenance (31 percent) budgets each
alone rival the Procurement budget in size in the FY 1991
Presidential budget. [Ref. 4:p. 19 0] The resources provided
by these two major budget categories are critical to national
defense as they reflect the cost of America's uniformed
manpower and the daily functions of the defense establishment.
In other words, these two appropriations provide for our basic
defense "readiness." [Ref. 3:p. 100]
The President's FY- 1992 Budget submission to Congress
indicates that the non- investment appropriations now represent
an even larger share of the defense budget [Ref. 4:p. 190].
One reason for this increase is that the costs have risen for
"additional training and maintenance demands associated with
the increasing cost and complexity of each new generation of
equipment" [Ref. 3:p. 98],
The operating accounts have grown to roughly 60 percent of
Program 051 in the FY- 1992 President's budget despite heavy
reductions imposed by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990
[Ref. 4:p. 190] . A report by the Congressional Budget Office
on the President's FY- 1992 Budget documents the magnitude of
the BEA cuts in defense, finding that:
Over five years, the largest reductions occur in funding for
military personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M)
.
Weapons procurement would fall by $25 billion, while
increases for RDT&E through 1994 would be more than offset
by reductions in 1995. [Ref. 5:p. 62]
Just how bad are these budget cuts? Between fiscal years
1991 and 1996, the MP and O&M appropriations will each be
reduced by nearly equal amounts with the combined total
reduction exceeding $140 billion. By contrast, investment
appropriations will lose only $30 billion in the same time
period. [Ref. 5:p. 63]
Based on current budget data, the operating accounts
appear to be taking the brunt of the cuts. One federal
financial authority predicted that large weapon system
acquisition funds would be the target for cuts, because pay
and operations costs are relatively fixed during peacetime
[Ref. 6:p. 105]. Are these costs really fixed? Recent
history argues they are not as supported by civilian personnel
reductions and hiring freezes. Another author's thoughts
seem to more closely mirror actions taken in the BEA:
When Congress must make cuts, they are made along the
path of least resistance. Traditionally, this means that
when defense is cut the burden falls on the readiness and
manpower accounts of the services. [Ref. 2:p. 391]
The services and Congress have incentives to cut the
operating fund accounts first because: (1) the effects are not
concentrated in any one district; (2) these accounts represent
'quick' money - as cuts in budget authority here will
immediately reduce outlays; (3) these categories are easier to
restore and rebuild (compared to major acquisitions) ; and (4)
,
if protecting procurement contracts is a goal, manpower and
readiness cuts can offset the contract costs. [Ref. 2:p. 391]
C. ARE THE OPERATING FUNDS FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE?
Why is it so difficult to maintain non- investment
appropriations? In part, the problem is that many essential
readiness and manpower functions such as recruiting, training,
medical care, housing, food, repairs and provision cannot be
directly related to major PPBS programs [Ref. 2:p. 352] . This
weakens their fiscal posture because, without ties to "hard"
programs, they can be difficult to support.
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However, even programs that can be related to missions
suffer from poor linkages between funding and outcomes. GAO
reports have found:
. . .no accountability systems linking military capability
and rising or falling program funding levels ... .Since
funding is not linked to intermediate outputs, such as
increased proficiency or increased readiness, there is no
way of determining if the services could achieve the same
goals with fewer dollars. [Ref. 2:p. 352]
The impact of budget cuts, regardless of the
appropriation, tend to cascade. Reducing a program's budget
in one fiscal year results in a reassessment of the "out -year"
budget needs (not only to compensate for the lost money, but
also to cover cost increases from the inefficiencies
introduced by the reduction). The latter change will, in
turn, affect the amount of money available for other programs
in the "out years"; so this "ripple effect" infiltrates all
future budgets affecting many more programs than the one
changed by the Congress. [Ref. 6:p. 102]
An example of this can be seen in the next chapter's
examination of a small Navy program, TEMDUINS (Temporary Duty
Under Instruction) . This program exactly fits the above
definition of "readiness" since TEMDUINS pays the per diem
for active duty service members who are in a training pipeline
between permanent duty station assignments.
11
III. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING FOR TEMDUINS
A. CURRENT PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING FOR TEMDUINS
The Navy programs and budgets for the per diem for en
route training for periods less than twenty weeks through the
Temporary Duty Under Instruction (TEMDUINS) program. Key
players in the process are the Resource Sponsor (OP- 120) , the
Program Manager (Pers-203) , the major claimant (Bureau of
Naval Personnel (BUPERS) , Pers-02) and the service members'
detailers (Pers-4/463) . A Resource Sponsor in the Navy is
responsible for the POM (Program Objective Memorandum) outyear
funding for several programs and/or claimancies, but is not
involved with their policies. By contrast, a Program
Manager's primary concern is the policies defining and guiding
his program. He is involved in budgeting in an ancillary
fashion, supporting the Resource Sponsor and the claimant.
The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval
Operations have transferred the Navy's fiscal role to the
Comptroller Office of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) . This
responsibility is further delegated to 23 major claimants.
Claimants then pass resources down to the Navy field
activities for obligation and expenditure as they carry out
their respective missions.
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The relationship between claimants and their subordinate
field activities or programs is often confusing. While they
are always fiscally linked, a program or activity's mission
and functions may be unrelated to those of its major claimant.
As a result, activities and programs must frequently serve two
"masters" - an administrative chain of command for funds (via
the major claimant) and an operational chain of command for
mission- related guidance (through the Program Manager)
.
Indirectly involved in TEMDUINS planning, programming and
budgeting are the Navy Warfare Program Coordinators for
Submarine (OP-29) , Surface (OP-39) and Aviation (OP-59) . One
thread, the Navy Training Plan, connects most of these
players. How these entities interact (or fail to do so) in
supporting TEMDUINS has made the program what it is today.
1. The Navy Training Plan
As mentioned, the Warfare Program Coordinators share
in identifying training requirements through the Navy Training
Plan (NTP) system. Each time a warfare platform is acquired
or modified, a training assessment is done and the impact on
currently available training is identified. An evaluation is
made as to what training will be needed for the individuals
who will be working on the equipment or assigned to the
platform. To marry the training required by the job to the




Each enlisted billet in the Navy requiring focused
training beyond what the incumbent's rate would provide is
designated with one (or more) NEC (Navy Enlisted
Classification) codes. Officer billets are coded in a roughly
similar fashion using subspecialty codes and Additional
Qualification Designators (AQDs) . Officer subspecialties are
analogous to developing a recognized skill through a
journeyman program. Criteria for subspecialty designation
include education, experience or a combination of the two.
AQDs are like NECs in that they communicate abilities the
incumbent should have to fill the billet, but differ in that
they often emphasize expertise gained outside the classroom.
Examples of AQDs include accreditation for division officer,
department head and other leadership tours.
Once the Warfare Program Coordinators have determined
that additional or revised training is needed, the
requirements for additional quotas, revised curriculum and
other facets are also addressed. This information is laid out
in a standardized format and becomes the NTP for that
particular platform. Normally, the contractor for the project
initiates the development of the NTP under the guidance of the
Warfare Program Coordinator and platform Program Manager. The
Warfare Coordinator correlates the draft NTP with approved
ship/squadron/shore manning documents which stipulate the type
and number of personnel allowed for the platform. A "Hardman"
analysis is also done which is a common sense approach whereby
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the new requirements proposed in the NTP are verified by-
comparing them to an existing system. The NTPs are then passed
to the Deputy, Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower,
Personnel and Training (OP- 01) for review and implementation.
[Ref. 7]
In OP- 01, an intensive review is conducted by the
Officer (Pers-211) and Enlisted (Pers-221) Community Managers
who examine the proposed NTPs for impact on their communities
and associated career paths. Special attention is also given
to the manpower changes (manning level in an enlisted rate,
shifts in number of personnel at certain paygrades, etc.)
which the NTP could affect. The TEMDUINS Program Manager
(Pers-203) then reviews the NTPs to assess the impact on
TEMDUINS' funding requirements.
The NTP is also analyzed by the Total Force Training
and Education Division (OP- 11) . The focus here is to ensure
that adequate training resources, such as facilities and
instructors, will be available. The requirement for
curriculum modifications is also addressed by this division.
2 . Navy' s Warfare Coordinators
a. The History of the Navy Warfare Coordinators
Until World War II, the shape of the Navy's
hierarchy was relatively static. Surface Warfare (OP- 03) was
the Navy's cornerstone for its military operations. After the
war, air power, and specifically the Army Air Corps, began to
15
receive significant attention. In a post-war reorganization
under CNO Admiral Ernest King, Air Warfare (OP- 05) emerged in
an effort to foster and legitimize Navy's role in aviation.
[Ref. 8:p. 17-19] Submarine Warfare (OP- 02) was established
in 1971 by CNO Admiral Zumwalt in 1971, thereby vesting each
of the three major warfare programs with permanent
representation in OPNAV [Ref. 8:p. 91].
This brief history of the Warfare Coordinators
illustrates their segregation, by mission, function and
organization. These differences also separate them from the
more administrative OPNAV offices such as OP- 01 (Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel and Training)
.
Next to be examined is how these parties impact the Navy's
TEMDUINS program.
b. The Warfare Coordinators and their Relationship to
TEMDUINS
A problem in Navy's TEMDUINS program occurs during
the planning phase, a problem that carries forward into the
programming phase. Changes to a warfare platform or system by
the Warfare Program Coordinators (OP-02, 03, and 05) routinely
generate a need for en route (TEMDUINS) training. Training
requirements may actually double for a period of time as a new
system is phased in, which naturally doubles the required
funding. While the NTP process provides the Warfare
Coordinators the means to forward revised training needs,
16
there is no way to ensure that all emerging training
requirements they forecast are reflected in TEMDUINS POM
submission.
This disconnect is partly due to the timing of 0P-
01 's receipt of the NTPs in the POM cycle. Further, there is
no Navy requirement for the Warfare Coordinators to provide
support for the training costs they are indirectly incurring.
These events contribute to the TEMDUINS program' s repeated
shortfall which the TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor and BUPERS
(Bureau of Naval Personnel) must cover by internally
realigning funds, decrementing other programs or soliciting
additional funding from NAVCOMPT.
Because en route training is centrally funded for
the entire Navy through the TEMDUINS program, the Warfare
Program Coordinators are probably unaware of the impact
additional training may impose. Applying economic theory,
they may view TEMDUINS as a free good without understanding
the opportunity costs to the Navy of increased TEMDUINS
requirements. Such opportunity costs include training which
must be foregone, related impacts on the associated training
sites and the resulting loss of trained personnel in key
mission areas. An additional opportunity cost to consider is
the effect on the Navy's non-training programs if they must be
reduced to cover TEMDUINS shortfalls.
It is understandable for the Warfare Program
Coordinators to identify more closely with their program and
17
their related impact on the fleet than with TEMDUINS. The
assumption seems to be that TEMDUINS funds will somehow be
provided because they always have been. History has proved
the Program Coordinators are correct in this assumption, but
it may not be an option in the future. TEMDUINS has been
subject to budget cuts each year as have most other programs
within the Department of Defense since 1986. While the BUPERS
claimancy, the TEMDUINS Program Manager and Resource sponsor
have battled successfully for supplements, these additions
have not offset increased training requirements and a
diminishing budget base [Ref. 9].
NAVCOMPT has twice disapproved proposals for the
TEMDUINS' Program to be supplemented by the Warfare
Coordinators. NAVCOMPT' s decision was that, as TEMDUINS was
an OP- 01 program, it was OP-01's responsibility, not the
Warfare Coordinators to provide the supplement . The bottom
line in NAVCOMPT' s ruling was essentially that, if OP- 01
wanted to fully fund TEMDUINS, it could be done by making
TEMDUINS a higher priority program and decrementing other OP-
01 programs to make up the shortfall. [Ref. 10]
While NAVCOMPT has a valid point, something is lost
by not tying projected TEMDUINS requirements more closely to
the Warfare Coordinators. If it were possible to include
TEMDUINS training funds as part of the total procurement
package, just as life cycle costs are, the visibility of the
18
total program would increase the likelihood that TEMDUINS
funds would be available when the platform was fielded.
Just as each warfare community has a unique
mission, they also have unique perspectives on their
involvement with TEMDUINS and problems associated with the
program. For the purpose of this thesis, attention will be
focused on the offices which deal strictly with training for
their respective community.
(1) Submarine Warfare Coordinator (OP -29)
On the subject of programming TEMDUINS funds,
the Submarine Warfare Coordinator (OP-02) supports NAVCOMPT's
view regarding TEMDUINS funding. The Warfare Coordinators do
not put money into training but neither does OP- 01 pay for
warfare platforms. OP-02's perspective is that if TEMDUINS is
severely underfunded, then OP- 01 should work within the POM
process, realign funds and fix the program permanently. [Ref
.
10]
As the Submarine Warfare Coordinator sees it,
part of the problem in planning for TEMDUINS requirements is
that there is currently no way to break out "C" (NEC
producing) schools [Ref. 10]. This is important because, for
enlisted personnel, TEMDUINS funds are meant to be used only
for NEC-producing courses. OP- 01 is now doing an analysis to
categorize Navy training. An offshoot of this effort will be
to identify courses TEMDUINS should pay for with the criterion
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of funding training that is NEC- related. Training is the
Submarine community's number one priority. They simply do not
accept anyone on a boat who does not have the requisite NECs
or training. Training is provided in one of two ways. Either
the sailor receives his NEC by attending a class at a remote
site which requires TEMDUINS funding, or he arrives without
training and attends school at a boat's homeport . Major
training facilities are available at most of the boat
homeports. This has the advantage that the sailor stays on
base for the training and ensures the sailor will be trained
before joining the boat. An added advantage is it saves
TEMDUINS funds. The disadvantage is that the boat will be
undermanned while the sailor is in school.
For the Submarine Warfare Coordinator, the
fundamental problem is identifying the actual training
requirements. When the TEMDUINS program was heavily funded,
this was not a significant problem. Now that funding has
gotten tight, however, the need to recognize Navy's training
requirements is becoming more apparent. In OP-29's view, 0P-
01' s reaction has been to seek additional funding as needed
instead of finding a long term solution. Since the Warfare
Coordinators' programs benefit from the training, the
perception has been that OP- 01 feels the benefactors should be
the ones to supplement the shortfalls. [Ref. 11]
The Submarine Warfare Coordinator instead sees
TEMDUINS as an OP- 01 managed and funded program and, therfore,
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OP-01's responsibility. The Warfare Coordinators have come to
question how closely OP- 01 has examined their "books" before
asking for more money. There is also a concern that OP-01's
funding priorities are different than the Warfare
Coordinators. [Ref. 11] The inference is that TEMDUINS
-
related training may not be OP-01's leading concern.
The Warfare Coordinators are reluctant to
transfer funds over to TEMDUINS for several reasons. The most
significant of these is the potential financial risks to their
own programs [Ref. 11]. This is understandable, considering
the logic often employed by many NAVCOMPT analysts. From
NAVCOMPT's perspective, the program providing compensation
must have been overfunded; otherwise, the sponsor could not
afford to cut his program to supplement TEMDUINS. Also, even
if NAVCOMPT allowed a Warfare Coordinator to decrease a
program to offset TEMDUINS, there is no guarantee NAVCOMPT
would not divert the funds to a program they felt had a higher
priority. Given such a scenario, the donors would face a
"lose-lose" situation; they would have lost funds and not have
achieved their objective.
One final difficulty that would occur if the
Warfare Coordinators gave over funding for TEMDUINS to OP- 01
is that they would have little say in expenditures under the
current personnel order writing system. The detailers have
ultimate control in how TEMDUINS funds are used as the
TEMDUINS dollars are obligated when the detailer writes a
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service member's PCS orders. To make the situation more
equitable, something would have to be done to convey the
Warfare Coordinator's priorities to the detailers and promote
their compliance. [Ref. 11]
The Submarine Warfare Coordinator offered two
broad suggestions to improve TEMDUINS planning, programming
and budgeting. First, OP- 01 should reset its priorities to
give TEMDUINS more visibility and, second, it needs to
supplement TEMDUINS to cover its long term program
requirements vice continuing on a "hand to mouth" basis. The
strategy offered to do this is to strengthen the system to
predict and monitor requirements and develop a strong back-up
database to track expenditures and validate the system.
Currently, no comparisons are being made between NTP training
cost projections and actual TEMDUINS requirements. Worse, as
no single office is in charge of all aspects of Navy's
TEMDUINS training requirement, there is no one to champion the
program and defend the requirements. [Ref. 11]
A centralized system to improve TEMDUINS
planning and programming might rely more heavily on NITRAS
[Ref. 11] . NITRAS is the Navy Integrated Training Resources
and Administration System, a database which includes
information on most Navy- taught courses. The problem with
NITRAS is that it is not all inclusive. Navy courses that do
not produce NECs, commercial courses, simulators, federal
22
courses and courses offered by other services are not fully-
identified in NITRAS.
Interest had been raised in the recent past in
improving NITRAS so it could be used more as a corporate
training data base for the Navy. The benefit would have been
the availability of a single data base covering all aspects of
Navy training. As its use increased, the hope was that
additional improvements could be made to the system. The
initiative failed, however, due to lack of funds. [Ref. 11]
Some type of requirements predicting systems is
still needed. Whatever system is chosen, it must be flexible
so as to capture atypical training situations like "F" schools
at the homeports and service member cross -training. The
Submarine Warfare Coordinator has faith in NITRAS and is
trying to make NITRAS work. One method involves advising
their subordinate commanding officers that NITRAS will be used
as a budget decision tool. Hence, if a submarine base
commanding officer has an "F" school located on his site, it
is in his best interest to ensure class load/graduate data and
other pertinent information is correctly loaded into NITRAS.
Failure to do so could result in budget and/or manpower cuts
by the Warfare Coordinator. Understandably, OP- 02 has found
this to be a strong motivator in gaining support for NITRAS.
[Ref. 11]
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The Submarine Warfare Coordinator's specific
suggestions to improve TEMDUINS are:
• Find a mechanism to force the identification of the Navy's
true training requirements. One option, although
difficult to implement, would be to examine the training
requirements of each billet.
• Use the Navy's current training system, NITRAS, to justify
TEMDUINS' funding requirements. If NITRAS will not meet
TEMDUINS' needs, then another system should be identified.
• As unfunded requirements will likely remain a fact of life
with the declining defense budget, a training priority
system should be devised by the fleet and ship type
commanders
.
• OP- 01 should "take charge" of the TEMDUINS program.
Aggressive action to strengthen or promote the program is
difficult, however, without solid background data to
support the requested funds. Also, TEMDUINS' historical
execution problem has damaged the program's credibility.
[Ref. 11]
One last problem facing TEMDUINS now is the
declining defense budget. While NAVCOMPT has been somewhat
cooperative in sustaining TEMDUINS in the past, manpower and
training related programs are likely to suffer as defense cuts
are impacted. When the choice must be made between hardware
and platforms or training, training is apt to lose. Even if
NAVCOMPT endorsed large increases for TEMDUINS, it may be
difficult to get the adjustments through OSD for the same
reasons cited above. [Ref. 11]
(2) Surface Warfare Coordinator (OP-39)
The Surface Warfare Coordinator indicated their
office programs all emerging training requirements for
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TEMDUINS through the NTP process. The representative said she
felt the NTP system was used and supported by the Warfare
Sponsors as the mechanism to identify these training needs.
In this way, the Warfare Coordinators respond to the planning
and programming for TEMDUINS. While recognizing that training
en route is OP-01's responsibility, they (OP- 39) will fund
related NEC-producing training if it cannot be funded under
TEMDUINS. [Ref. 12]
The Surface Warfare Coordinator primarily sees
the NTP process working through the Enlisted Community
Managers [Ref. 12] . This is because the bulk of NTP courses
affect enlisted NECs . While courses for officers are covered
under NTPs, they represent a smaller section of Navy's
training requirements.
The Fleet CINCs (Commanders-in-Chief) under 0P-
03 are implementing a computer program which will delineate
how TAD (Temporary Assigned Duty) per diem funds were used in
a fiscal year. This system will capture how much "TEMDUINS
-
type" training the CINCs are doing using their own travel
funds. In this situation, "TEMDUINS- type" training is NEC-
producing training which should have been provided under
TEMDUINS but which, for some reason, was not delivered. The
CINCs are then using their own travel funds to ensure the
individual gets the necessary NEC for his billet. The Surface
Warfare Coordinator is interested in correlating the
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information but has yet to determine how the data will be
used.
One possibility is for the Surface Warfare
Coordinator to seek reimbursement from OP- 01. A more logical
option may be to transfer the funds spent on "TEMDUINS- type"
training over to OP- 01 for TEMDUINS. The advantage would be
that TEMDUINS would be able to identify more of the true Navy
training requirement, and the CINCs would disassociate
themselves from the training "business." [Ref. 13]
The driver behind the TEMDUINS problem from the
Surface Warfare Coordinator's perspective is the current
inability to identify all the courses which should be covered
by TEMDUINS. An initiative currently being undertaken by the
Total Force Training and Education Division (OP- 11) of OP- 01
was recognized as a step in the right direction. The benefit
is that TEMDUINS courses (or NEC-producing courses) will be
given more visibility, both programmatically and fiscally.
Upper levels of Navy management then can better see what needs
to be done to fix the TEMDUINS account. Solutions could
possibly include the transfer of funds between OP codes to
increase TEMDUINS' funding. [Ref. 13] This study will be
covered in greater depth later in this chapter.
The Surface Warfare Coordinator finds their
largest and most frequent TEMDUINS -associated problem is with
engineering- related equipment training, especially in the area
of miniature and micro equipment repair. The difficulty
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encountered is that the new equipment often requires
modification of the Navy's current courses to cover the unique
requirements of the equipment, or the equipment design is so
different that new courses must be developed. However, these
systems are often fielded before any training can be provided,
so the fleet must play "catch up." This is especially
difficult when several such instances arise on one ship or if
the total ship design falls into such a category [Ref.
13] . This situation could be a source of
TEMDUINS' anomalies. Consider the example of a new- generation
aircraft elevator on an aircraft carrier. The Navy has had
elevators on ships for years, but this particular elevator is
unique and operates differently from others. It is, however,
a relatively small item on the building of an aircraft carrier
and its uniqueness was somehow not realized. As a result, no
NTP change to the Navy's elevator maintenance school was
submitted. The course may have been modified to reflect the
variation but without an NTP change driving the need for a
course creation or modification, the need to adjust the NTP
never came to the attention of the TEMDUINS Program Manager.
This scenario can seriously impact TEMDUINS in
two ways if the resulting training change either lengthens or
establishes a school: (1) it will generate an unforeseen need
for additional TEMDUINS in the near term as orders are
executed, and (2) it will be difficult for the TEMDUINS
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Resource Sponsor to justify additional requirements in the POM
for these invisible increases. [Ref. 13]
How does this disconnect occur? The problem
lies between the procurement and NTP processes. When a
contract allows for the vendor to use contractor vice
government furnished equipment, deviations as described above
can occur. The NTP is not modified because the magnitude of
the differences between the equipment types is not always
noticed or readily discernable. This has been most noticeable
in the area of hull, mechanical and engineering equipment, as
there are frequently last minute changes to these items as a
ship is being built. [Ref. 13]
(3) Aviation Warfare Coordinator (OP -59)
The Aviation Warfare Coordinator's perspective
towards the TEMDUINS program is that all enlisted personnel
requiring an NEC should be receiving training en route. As
TEMDUINS is under OP-01's cognizance, it is OP-01's
requirement to fund this pre- fleet arrival training. In the
Aviation Warfare Coordinator's (OP- 59) view, OP- 01 assumes
that the training system is perfect which has left little
slack in the training pipeline. [Ref. 14] Addressing the
previous requests from OP- 01 to prioritize training to stretch
TEMDUINS' dollars farther, the response was:
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When the CNO prioritizes the Navy, we'll prioritize our
training requirement. If TEMDUINS can't provide the
needed training, its then the TYCOMs (Ship Type
Commanders) problem. [Ref. 15]
The Aviation Warfare Coordinator sees problems
arise when recruit (boot camp) or "A" (basic rate skills)
school training completion dates slip. This has an immediate
effect on "C" (NEC-producing) schools which are the TEMDUINS
funded courses. Prospective "C" school students must wait
until the next class convening date, earning TEMDUINS - funded
per diem the entire time. [Ref. 14] From the student's
perspective, this is only fair as they are not responsible for
the delay.
The Aviation Warfare Coordinator has been
working with OP- 01 since 1974 to streamline the training
pipeline and training requirements. Using the MMTR (Military
Manpower Training Reports) process, they have identified
redundancies and updated training needs to maximize cost-
ef fectiveness . [Ref. 14]
Any emerging training requirements or changes
to aviation programs are communicated to the TEMDUINS Program
Manager (Pers-2 03) in the POM process. The Enlisted Community
Managers (ECMs) for aviation ratings take the Aviation Warfare
Coordinator's input and relate it to the revised number of
enlisted end strength and rate changes. As the aviation
community averages a three year sea/shore rotation, the ECMs
then roughly estimate that one- third of the personnel they
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manage will require "C" school training. [Ref . 14] While this
seems to be an efficient way to estimate costs, it creates a
possibility for over-estimating. The question that must be
addressed is: must 30 percent of all the aviation enlisted
personnel be retrained every three years for every possible
tour of duty?
This method of estimating creates another
problem in that the number of students exceeds the number of
available " C" school seats. The result is that personnel are
"stashed" as the fleet units want personnel only after they've
been trained but the schools are overfilled.
Why is the fleet so reluctant to take untrained
assets? Three reasons support this sentiment: (1) lack of
time to train people, (2) lack of manpower to afford the loss
of a sailor once he's reported aboard and (3) lack of unit
travel funds to cover NEC training. The fleet's travel or TAD
funds are small and are usually reserved for team training
pre -deployment exercises. Even a centrally funded TDY-and-
return program would not be much of a solution in the fleet's
eyes due to the uncontrollable factor of the ships' operating
tempo and operational commitments. These reasons make it
difficult to meet convening dates. [Ref. 14]
The NTP disconnect related to platform upgrades
and commissionings seen by the Surface Warfare Coordinator is
not a problem for the aviation community. At Naval Air
Systems Command Headquarters (NAVAIR) , the Aviation Training
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Systems Program Office's (PMA 2 05) purpose is to monitor
training associated with aviation acquisitions. They work
with the aviation system Program Managers (PM) plus other
major Navy acquisition offices to ensure training requirements
are identified. The PM should then ensure factory training is
covered under the acquisition contract or that funds for the
training are provided for in the POM. A suggestion being
fielded currently in NAVAIR is that the acquisition funds for
a platform be increased to include funds for basic training on
the unit and continue until it is totally phased into fleet
operation. At that time, the normal training funding process
could resume. [Ref . 14] This recommendation would alleviate
several current TEMDUINS' problems: sufficient funding and
program visibility. Difficult questions would have to be
answered relating to the execution of these unique funds, such
as:
How could this money be protected or ear-marked for the
special uses it was acquired for?
Who would manage the funds? Would they be transferred over
to OP- 01 for incorporation in TEMDUINS?
Another option would be to pass these training monies down to
the fleet units as additional TAD funding. The drawbacks with
this plan were stated earlier. The loss of onboard assets is
a hardship for the fleet due to manpower shortages. Also,
unpredictability of operating schedules makes scheduling
schools for onboard personnel difficult.
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The Aviation Warfare Coordinator also noted the
extreme paradox between the Navy's Total Quality Leadership
(TQL) program and cuts to our training dollars. TQL is
receiving major emphasis from the CNO on down through the
fleet [Ref . 16] . A major element of TQL is to ensure that
personnel are adequately trained. Decrementing TEMDUINS or
other training- related dollars is in direct conflict with
Navy's TQL policy. [Ref. 14]
Current Navy actions are also exacerbating
training fund deficiencies. Unless the savings accrued by
decreasing the number of operating sites are offsetting,
consolidation of training sites will likely increase training
travel costs. No one site can be equidistant from all Navy
activities, so the farther the distance, the higher the travel
costs. [Ref. 14]
A problem whose magnitude has yet to be fully
realized is the new GenDet (General Duty) policy. A few years
ago, afloat units were having difficulty gaining enough
General Duty enlisted personnel for the Deck division.
Enlisted members reporting aboard ships designated with a
rating went to work in that division. As more sailors were
being "rated" before reaching the ship, this left a
diminishing pool of people left to serve as Boatswains Mates
in the Deck division. The problem began to take on racial
overtones as, most frequently the non- rated sailors were
minority members who could not pass the rate exams early in
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their careers. Discontent arose as the dirty work on the ship
began to fall most often on these minority sailors.
The fleet proposed and OPNAV (OP- 01) approved
the GenDet program in 1989. Under GenDet, prospective sailors
agree to serve in general duty capacities aboard a ship for up
to two years after which they are guaranteed rate -specific
training. This training was to be centrally funded just as
rate/NEC training is for other naval personnel. Funds were
added to TEMDUINS in FY- 90 to support this new program.
The actual execution of the GenDet program is
not going as planned, however, according to the Aviation
Warfare Coordinator. Some sailors are getting rated through
on-the-job training. While this is a cost-savings to the
Navy, there is no standardization or quality assurance of
training received. Others are attending school while attached
to the ship using a "fleet" seat as a few quotas are
frequently reserved at the schools for the fleet's use. This
is still a savings to the TEMDUINS program but represents both
a dollar and manpower cost to the ship as the sailor is
unavailable for shipboard work and command funds are used.
To date, the Aviation Warfare Coordinator knows of no GenDets
going back to school using TEMDUINS funds. Queries are being
made as to whether this is a policy issue or a complication in
the BUPERS order writing process. [Ref . 14]
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3. TEMDUINS Program Manager (Pers-2 03)
The TEMDUINS Program Manager (Pers-203) is dual-hatted
in that the incumbent is both responsible for TEMDUINS and
functions as the Navy Policy Coordinator. As the TEMDUINS
Program Manager, Pers-203 must first ensure that future
requirements are accurately estimated and projected in the
POM. Requirements that are not covered in the POM must be
worked to gain funding. In years past, this was difficult due
to the competing programs in OP- 01, but not impossible.
Decreasing Navy budgets will make the battle for funding items
outside of the POM increasingly difficult.
The TEMDUINS Program Manager reviews all NTP change
proposals provided to him. His analysis focuses on the
financial impact of NTP changes on TEMDUINS. If increased
costs are expected and have not been included in the POM, the
TEMDUINS Program Manager notes this in his comments on the
NTP. However, lack of TEMDUINS' funds has not been sufficient
reason to prevent an NTP change from being implemented. This
has been a source of frustration in that the TEMDUINS Program
Manager can see a financial problem in the making but has no
power to stop it or force compensation. The result is that
the TEMDUINS program must absorb the growth or additional
funds must be found. If the shortfall arises during the
budget execution year, either the BUPERS claimancy or NAVCOMPT
must supply the needed funding. Shortages before the
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execution year normally must be covered either by BUPERS or
OP- 120, the TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor. [Ref. 17]
The TEMDUINS Program Manager gives execution guidance
to the officer and enlisted detailers (Pers-4) through a
Policy Decision Memorandum (PDM) . The PDM describes in
general terms what the focus should be for training in the
current fiscal year. The emphasis is on the types of training
for which TEMDUINS should be used (primarily NEC-producing
training plus non-NEC training for overseas personnel only)
and cost -savings measures the detailers should observe [Ref.
18] . Priority is normally given to training which can be done
at sites co- located with the servicemember' s current or
prospective duty station or when the Manning Control Authority
has certified the need [Ref. 17]
.
4. TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor (OP- 120)
The TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor is responsible for
acquiring, monitoring and protecting the funds for the program
in the outyears . Through the POM process, Pers-463 and the
cognizant budget analysts in the BUPERS Resources Department
(Pers-02) work with Pers-2 03 to forecast outyear TEMDUINS
requirements. Because of the involvement of the TEMDUINS
Program Manager with the revisions to the Navy Training Plans,
this should be an effective system. The resulting product is
then consolidated by BUPERS into its final claimancy POM
request and submitted to OP- 120, the Resource Sponsor for both
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TEMDUINS and the entire BUPERS organization. Preparation of
TEMDUINS' annual NAVCOMPT, OSD and President's budget requests
is done in a manner similar to the POM submission process with
Pers-463, BUPERS and the TEMDUINS Program Manager working as
a team.
As seen by the TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor, the
program's biggest deficiency is the lack of historical data to
support POM and budget requests. It has been found that
TEMDUINS typically mirrors PCS requirements but on a
proportionately lower funding level. This link is to be
expected as PCS dollars provide the transportation to a school
and TEMDUINS provides the student with per diem while there.
But tying TEMDUINS to PCS is not especially valuable as the
PCS account also lacks a strong, current historical data base.
Without up-to-date information, there is no accurate way to
analyze the needs of either program. OP- 120 is presently
doing some statistical regression internally in an effort to
develop a prediction model for PCS. [Ref 19]
A second problem noted by the Resource Sponsor is the
disconnect between the appropriations funding TEMDUINS and
PCS. TEMDUINS draws its resources from the Operations and
Maintenance, Navy appropriation while PCS is funded under the
Military Personnel, Navy (MPN) appropriation. Since the two
programs operate "hand in glove, " why have they been broken
apart in the appropriations?
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Funds from both programs are tapped in the PCS order
writing process if an individual merits TEMDUINS payment. The
issue becomes more complex as it is possible for courses
normally covered by TEMDUINS to be funded entirely by the PCS
account. The division between the two funding sources is not
the type of training provided, but the length of the training
pipeline. If the service member attends training for less
than twenty weeks in conjunction with a PCS transfer, the
TEMDUINS account pays for per diem. For periods of training
twenty weeks or longer, the sailor is no longer entitled to
per diem and the PCS account pays all costs. [Ref. 19]
The arbitrary division based on the number of days has
resulted in duplicate program monitoring systems, POM and
budget submissions. Also, two separate BUPERS offices execute
the two programs, each with a different perspective. If
TEMDUINS could be shifted to the MPN appropriation with the
PCS account, the Navy could have better coordination with a
single office for program execution operating under one
perspective. Another advantage to moving TEMDUINS from 0&M,N
to MPN would be flexibility. The MPN appropriation is far
larger than BUPERS or the TEMDUINS 0&M,N budgets which would
make funding shortages much simpler and easier to rectify.
[Ref. 19]
The TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor noted that with the
funding decreases Navy is facing, prioritizing training is
becoming necessary. Inquiries have found that detailers are
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sending service members to schools not NEC-producing or
specifically required by their next assignment because of
questions in the rating advancement examinations. The Navy's
policy for rate examinations is not currently matching the
reality of the force downsizing.
There is no dispute that the information presented in
the courses is not important but the related policies reflect
the ideal situation where TEMDUINS is fully funded and money
is no object. The conflict is that, while OP- 120 would like
the service members to have the benefit of these courses, the
funding isn't available to cover them as well as the Navy's
critical, job- related training. A scrubbing process is
becoming increasingly important, but it will not likely happen
until TEMDUINS funding shortfalls force the situation. At
that time, the Navy Resource Sponsors and Warfare Program
Coordinators will have to make the policies align with fiscal
reality and honestly evaluate rating policy requirements.
[Ref. 19]
5. Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS)
The Bureau of Naval Personnel is the claimant for
several field activities and major Navy programs including
TEMDUINS. As mentioned previously, claimaints have been given
the responsibility for budgeting for their subordinates during
the execution years and providing administrative oversight.
Because the subordinate programs still receive major mission
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direction from their Program Manager, the claimants often
function as administrative managers or "middlemen."
In the case of TEMDUINS, two BUPERS offices are
involved in program execution and administration. The BUPERS
Comptroller (Pers-02) holds fiscal responsibility for TEMDUINS
and handles the current year budgeting. The BUPERS
Distribution Department (Pers-4) coordinates the assignment of
all active duty naval personnel. The Fiscal Management Branch
(Pers-463) allocates TEMDUINS funds out to the detailers for
use in writing PCS orders and monitors the fund status on a
monthly basis. Towards the close of the fiscal year, or in
situations of fiscal duress, both Pers-02 and 463 receive
weekly reports on the balance of TEMDUINS funds.
a. Resources Management Office, Bureau of Naval
Personnel (Pers -02)
During a recent meeting with the author, the
BUPERS' Comptroller noted that NAVCOMPT analysts generally
believe that TEMDUINS' requirements should be identified in
the NTP. Further, these analysts tend to view the NTP as a
concrete, cohesive, static entity that "should" be easy to
price out and execute. The requirements are neither static
nor all contained in the NTPs . However, since OP- 01 is both
responsible for the NTP and the TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor,
NAVCOMPT personnel interpret that any TEMDUINS shortfalls as
evidence of lack of support by the Resource Sponsor. [Ref. 1]
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Actions internal to the OP- 01 organization have
also hindered the TEMDUINS program. OP- 11 (Total Force
Training and Education Policy Division), OP- 12 (Total Force
Programming and Manpower Division) and Pers-2 (Military
Personnel Policy Division and Career Progression Department,
previously OP- 13) have not provided support in the form of a
data base which would delineate what training requirements
have been funded and approved for use by assignment personnel.
Instead, during budget execution, TEMDUINS appears to be used
to provide NEC-producing training or training requirements
justified by the fleet, the Warfare Coordinators (OP- 02, 03,
and 05) or System Program Sponsors (NAVSEA, NAVAIR, etc) .
[Ref. 1] TEMDUINS requirements are thus satisfied on the
basis of demand with no means of prioritizing training needs
or providing approved, funded training before other emergent,
unfunded training.
The BUPERS claimancy has found it difficult to keep
TEMDUINS "fixed" in the budget because the program is too
large to fence from fact -of -life changes and budget cuts
directed at travel costs. As an example, the program was
increased in the summer of 1990 for FY- 91 which should have
put TEMDUINS on solid ground. But in January 1991, a per diem
rate increase issued by the Per Diem Travel and Transportation
Allowances Committee to implement a change in law gave all
enlisted personnel an additional $3.50 in per diem for meal
reimbursement. The impact of this change on TEMDUINS, a
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program totally based on per diem, was a $3.2 million
shortfall for the rest of FY-91. [Ref. 1]
OP- 11, OP- 12 and Pers-2 have examined the problem
of tracking and estimating TEMDUINS but they have been unable
to reach any mutually agreeable solutions. A concern with any
proposed system is the reaction of the detailers. One concern
is that the detailers (Pers-4) might be reluctant to use or
support such a system if it reduced their "flexibility" as
schools are still used as incentives in selling a difficult
set of orders. It appears that the historical solution for
TEMDUINS has been to simply put more money into the program
and not work on the process. [Ref. 1]
What does the future look like for TEMDUINS? The
pressure to fund additional training is likely to remain,
especially retraining of existing personnel as the size and
structure of the Navy change. The idea here is to preserve
the "investment" the Navy has in personnel even though the
specific skills in which they have been trained are no longer
required. An area of concern for NAVCOMPT may be that, even
with a decreasing force structure since 1986, the Navy's
TEMDUINS requirements have gone up. There are logical
explanations for this, such as the need to cross -train
personnel due to the decommissioning or modifications of
warfare platforms. Also, some training pipelines have been
cut in an effort to save MPN funds, which then increased the
training to be done under 0&M,N through TEMDUINS by reducing
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the individual's training pipe from greater than 20 weeks to
less than 20 weeks. Without a quantifiable system to document
these and other phenomena, NAVCOMPT analysts may begin to
think they are not being given an accurate portrayal of
TEMDUINS program needs. [Ref . 1]
To better predict TEMDUINS' fiscal needs and
expenditure patterns, the BUPERS' TEMDUINS budget analyst
tracks the current year expenditures and does statistical
analysis to correlate the present status with prior years.
This has proven valuable as the peculiarities of the TEMDUINS
program make it difficult to easily see how the program is
executing. In routine TAD assignments, a service member will
receive their orders, plus a travel advance for per diem and
lodging, a few days before their departure. Upon returning
from this short trip, a travel claim is to be submitted
normally within five working days. The claim is adjudicated
and any shortages or overages are reconciled with the service
member. The entire process takes only a few weeks.
The process is much more complicated for TEMDUINS.
PCS orders, citing TEMDUINS per diem authorization, are
written as far in advance as a year before the service
member's rotation date. The service member may then be in
class up to twenty weeks and also may be allowed thirty days
of leave plus travel time. Only on reporting to their new
duty station does the service member file their PCS travel
claim. Like a local travel TAD claim, the PCS claim is
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adjudicated and the account settled. Therefore, for just one
sailor, TEMDUINS funding could be obligated nearly a year and
a half before the final expenditure is made before over (or
under) obligation of funds may be realized.
Estimates used by the detailers are the basis for
TEMDUINS over/under obligation but the detailers also face
limitations. Situations may arise at the school site which
increase the per diem requirement. An example would be a fire
in the enlisted quarters rendering them inhabitable that
necessitates students staying at motels. The TEMDUINS
estimates themselves also create errors for the detailers. As
per diem rates are scaled to cover the meal and lodging costs
of a geographic area, generic estimates are not especially
accurate. However, the large number of orders processed
citing TEMDUINS makes using such estimates a necessity.
Jb. Fiscal Management Branch, Distribution Department,
Bureau of Naval Personnel (Pers-463)
The Fiscal Management Branch serves as the link
between the detailers, the BUPERS Comptroller and the TEMDUINS
Program Manager. The branch estimates how much TEMDUINS
funding each detailing section will require for the year, by
quarter, and supplies it to the Comptroller for fund
allocation. The branch also relays programmatic information
and execution guidelines from the TEMDUINS Program Manager to
the detailers.
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The Fiscal Management Branch distributes the quarterly
TEMDUINS allocations to the major detailing sections who pass
the funding availability down to the individual detailers.
Each detailer has a TEMDUINS "check book" with the opening
balance being their initial allotment of funds. Each time a
set of orders is written, the check balance is decremented.
"Deposits" are made as the detailer receives additional
increments of TEMDUINS funds
.
The problem with this system is that TEMDUINS' long
execution window prevents the detailer from "balancing" the
check book. On the average, it will be six to nine months
before a travel claim is filed on a set of TEMDUINS orders.
Only at that time could it be said that a detailer' s "check"
has cleared the bank. Because the order- writing computer
system is not linked to the computer system processing the PCS
travel claims, a further complication arises. The detailer
cannot match his TEMDUINS estimate to the actual amount spent
on a member's orders to adjust his check book for any savings
or underestimates. Historically, the estimates used by the
detailers have exceeded what was actually spent, despite
frequent revisions to the estimate tables. Therefore, due to
the slow processing of orders and inability of the detailers
to balance his checkbook, the detailers actually need to be
given an amount larger than what they should be spending . The
Fiscal Management Branch and the BUPERS TEMDUINS budget
44
analyst monitor this dichotomy closely during the year to
prevent a statutory violation.
In allocating TEMDUINS assets to the detailers, the
Fiscal Management Branch must also allow for the prior fiscal
year's "bow wave." This bow wave is caused by TEMDUINS orders
initiated in one fiscal year carrying over into the subsequent
year. For example, if a sailor detaches from his last command
in August and reports for a 15 week school beginning 1
September, he will have roughly five weeks of TEMDUINS per
diem paid out of the current fiscal year 0&M,N appropriation
and the balance will be paid out of the next fiscal year's
funds. The program can be quickly put into extremis if a
large number of orders citing TEMDUINS are written late in the
fiscal year. Fortunately, a limiting factor on the bow wave
is that most of the schools resulting in large TEMDUINS
payments convene either early in the summer or after the
beginning of the fiscal year.
The Fiscal Management Branch has been somewhat
frustrated in its role as it has the responsibility of
executing TEMDUINS yet has no authority to prioritize training
when funding becomes limited. The Policy Decision Memorandum
(PDM) provided by the TEMDUINS Program Manager has not proved
as helpful as hoped for. The guidance in the PDM has been
broad and often echoed practical, cost -saving steps already
put into effect by the branch. [Ref. 20]
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B. Summary
Based upon the above information, there appears to be four
significant problems associated with the planning, programming
and budgeting of Navy's TEMDUINS program:
• Emerging training requirements are difficult to identify
and incorporate into TEMDUINS' funding line.
• The actual expenditure of TEMDUINS funds cannot be
correlated with personnel trained or initial fund
obligations.
• The program is often driven by its funding level vice the
Navy's true training requirements.
• There is no mechanism for setting priorities to maximize
TEMDUINS' dollars when funding is limited.
This look at the TEMDUINS program illustrates the 'ripple
effect' of fiscal and policy changes at other levels in the
Navy which undermine the coherence of the TEMDUINS planning,
programming and budgeting process. The following chapter will
examine how the Navy's sister services deal with their
TEMDUINS -like programs.
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IV. VARIATIONS ON A THEME: HOW THE OTHER SERVICES MANAGE
THEIR TDY EN ROUTE PROGRAM
All four services use appropriated Operations and
Maintenance funds to centrally support training for military
personnel conducted en route between permanent duty stations.
The funding reaches the individual service member in the form
of per diem in accordance with the Joint Services Travel
Regulation [Ref. 21].
The focus of this chapter will be to examine how the Army,
Air Force and Marines manage their temporary duty (TDY) en
route programs which are equivalent to Navy's TEMDUINS
program. A comparative analysis of the programs should
provide an understanding of alternative ways for the Navy to
manage TEMDUINS
.
A. ARMY'S ATRRS PROGRAM
1. Army Training Doctrine
Under the Total Army concept, the Army's mission is to
"deter any attack upon U.S. national interests and, if
deterrence fails, to engage and defeat any enemy in any
environment." [Ref. 22 :p. 21-1] The decision in 1984 to
designate "Training" as a new Total Army Goal emphasized the
Army leadership's commitment to quality training and its
contribution to accomplishing the Total Army mission. Their
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training goal is "to produce a force trained to mobilized,
deploy, fight and win anywhere in the world." [Ref. 22:p. 21-
1] To reach this goal, the Army has identified six training
objectives: Institutional, Active Component (AC), Reserve
Component (RC) , Civilian Component, Support and Training
Research and Development [Ref. 22:p. 21-1]. The emphasis on
training is understandable, as "almost everything in the Army
does impact, either directly or indirectly, on training."
[Ref. 22:p. 21-3]
For many years, there was no single manager for
training in the Army as responsibility was divided between the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) . Analysis
made it clear that the training function at Army Headquarters
needed to be centralized to meet the challenges of the future.
In October 1978, the Training Directorate (TRADOC) was formed
as a part of DCSOPS, providing the Army with a single point of
contact for all issues having an impact on training. [Ref.
22:p. 21-4]
Department of the Army training management guidance
defines policy and emphasizes training- for- results with
performance -oriented training deemed as the best approach.
"The Army Plan," AR 350-37, provides overall direction for
Army training while the "Management of Army Individual
Training Requirements," AR 350-10, gives practical guidelines
for developing the Army's training programs. [Ref. 22 :p. 21-5]
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2. The Army Training Requirements and Resourcing System
(ATRRS)
ATRRS originated as a no- cost bulletin board computer
system in 19 77. A set of notebooks was the analyst's only
tools to document and forecast Total Army training
requirements. Of the numerous benefits automation could
provide, the two most desired were visibility of requirements
and query capability. [Ref. 23]
General Max Thurmon was serving in the Army Military
Personnel Directorate in the late 1970 's and saw the need for
a personnel and training computer system. Upon his
designation as Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Thurmon was
able to promote this system [Ref. 24] . A "Steady State Study"
conducted in 19 83 revealed four major problems such a system
should address:
Inconsistent manpower/personnel needs and training base
capacity.
Total Army failure to fill resourced training seats.
Lack of a consolidated database to track "spaces"/ "faces"
transactions in acquiring, training and distributing
personnel
.
Lack of a single Army staff manager responsible for
coordinating input to training. [Ref. 25]
Largely due to improvements generated by the Steady
State Study, ATRRS has expanded to a comprehensive computer
system residing on four mainframe computer systems driven by
three IBM 39 computers. ATRRS still has its "bulletin board"
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capability as most large Army activities have access to ATRRS
as do all DoD schools. [Ref. 24]
ATRRS has the unique ability to tie "faces" (service
personnel) with "spaces" (school class seats) . Its other
capabilities provide for: class scheduling, quota management,
report generation, training seat reservations, input and
graduation update, budgeting, program execution analysis,
Total Army Individual Training Solicitation (TACITS) and
Military Manpower Training Report (MMTR) data collection.
[Ref. 26 :p. 6] ATRRS is also used by Army Mobilization
Managers as it allows the Army's peacetime requirements to
mirror mobilization needs. The system proved its value in
Desert Storm when reservists with appropriate training were
easily identified for specific missions. There was no need to
modify ATRRS because this capability is inherent in the
system. [Ref. 23]
The Army ATRRS process consists of three major steps:
(1) development of individual training requirements, (2)
identification of resource courses and (3) execution of
training programs [Ref. 22]. Each step will be closely
examined
.
a. Development of Individual Training Requirements
The first phase in developing individual training
requirements starts with identifying force structure
authorizations from the Personnel Structure and Compositions
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System (PERSACS) and Active Army Military Manpower Program
(AAMMP) . PERSACS' reviews are done in April and November,
while the AAMMP is produced as needed, but at least monthly.
The PERSACS contains detailed information on the force
structure of all Army components down to the MOS (Military
Occupational Specialty, equivalent to a Navy enlisted NEC or
officer subspecialty) . The AAMMP has Army manning data
including Active Army end strength, recruiting requirements
and training throughput for seven years. [Ref. 22 :p. 21-6]
The Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) , a
component of DCSPERS, reviews the PERSACS and makes
adjustments to reflect "all unit activations/inactivations,
conversions, known modernization impacts, or other changes."
The updated PERSACS is used to generate a comprehensive
manning document, the Personnel Management Authorization
Document (PMAD) . This, in turn, is the basis for revising the
MOS Level (MOSL) System. [Ref. 22 :p. 21-6]
The MOSL compares authorizations defined in the
PMAD against the Army's MOS and grade inventory which is aged
to the fiscal year in question by adjusting for gains, losses
and similar factors. The output is the number of soldiers, by
skill, which must be trained to ensure that inventory matches
authorizations. A similar process is used by the Army
Reserve. [Ref. 22:pp. 21-6,7]
The results of these reviews establish the Total
Army accession- driven training requirements which are given to
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DCSPER for incorporation into ATRRS . Officer and non-
commissioned officer training requirements are provided as
well. Additionally, PERSCOM identifies and includes in ATRRS
the requirements for in-service personnel needing training to
"support professional development, reenlistment or
reclassification programs, and mission requirements." [Ref
22:pp. 21-6,7]
PERSCOM also solicits information to update ATRRS
from other Army Major Commands (MACOMS 1 ) , State Adjutants
General and other agencies and services using the TACITS
(Total Army Centralized Individual Training Solicitation)
program, a subsystem of ATRRS. TACITS identifies and collects
training needs for all courses taught for or by the Army
including data such as length, capacity, frequency and
location. [Ref. 27] To ensure support, TACITS has been
designated as "the only official solicitation recognizing Army
training requirements for military and civilian personnel."
[Ref. 28]
A TACITS catalogue is sent to all Army commands
each summer. From August to December, every Army
organizational level evaluates its training requirements for
the next five years and identifies corresponding courses
1 Army Major Commands (MACOMS) are similar to the Navy's
Warfare Coordinators and major claimants. MACOMS include the
U.S. Army, Europe; Eighth U.S. Army; U.S. Army Western
Command; U.S. Army South; Forces Command; and the Special
Operations Command.
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available in TACITS. [Ref. 29] The activities are motivated
to participate in the process as they understand that only-
requirements submitted through TACITS will ultimately result
in school quotas [Ref. 27].
The training requirements are consolidated at each
echelon as the submission works its way up through the MACOM
structure with the MACOM making the final composite entry into
the ATRRS database [Ref. 29]. In January, the ATRRS Program
Managers review the Army's input plus requests from other
agencies (i.e., Navy, Air Force, DoD) . After analyzing the
revised ATRRS data, the schools are asked to calculate their
own resource requirements based on the new ATRRS information.
The schools also function as a "sanity check, " commenting on
the impact of proposed changes to training throughput. The
ATRRS Program Managers have until late March to complete their
studies and identify any funding problems. [Ref. 24]
b. Resourcing Required Courses
After establishing the training requirements, the
training program for each MOS must be developed. The key to
this process is the Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR)
:
The SMDR is designed to validate Total Army training
requirements and then reconcile those requirements to an
affordable, acceptable, and executable training
program. . .Training requirements will be initially
established for the third POM year, validated for the
second POM year (primary focus of the SMDR)
,
and fine-
tuned for the first POM year. [Ref. 26 :p. 10]
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The SMDR is a joint operation conducted by DCSPER
and DCSOPS each August. Attendees include representatives
from TRADOC, PERSCOM, the MACOMs and each individual proponent
school. [Ref. 30] These SMDR participants provide vital
information to the process, i.e., facility availability,
training capability resources, training policy, training
requirements and equipment availability priority [Ref. 25].
The SMDR is unique in that it covers, course by
course, the building of the Army's training program [Ref.
24] . During the SMDR, fund realignment is the rule in an
effort to hold training to a zero-budget growth. How is this
done?
The SMDR breaks courses into three categories,
where:
• Requirements equal available resources,
• Requirements exceed the resources, but funding can be
provided or the requirements decreased without
significantly impacting readiness, and
• Requirements exceed the resources, significant additional
funds are needed, and the requirements cannot be lowered
without severely affecting the manning program. Courses
in this category are described as "constrained." [Ref.
22:p. 21-7]
Trade-offs between resources and requirements are
the most frequent compromise made to rectify category two
conflicts, especially when the proposed training is considered
mandatory. Other concessions have included deleting older
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courses and searching for a different type of training
presentation. [Ref. 24]
Decisions too difficult for a group resolution are
documented and presented to the "Council of Colonels", a board
comprised of 0-6 officers [Ref. 24] . The Council "attempts to
confirm category two adjustments/resources and move as many
courses as possible from category three to category two."
[Ref. 22:p. 21-7]
The remaining unresolved courses are passed to a
General Officer Manning/Training Review. The officers review
and approve motions made by the "Council of Colonels."
Courses still "constrained" are adjudicated by these flag
level officers who recommend a course of action. If a
"constrained" course is then funded, that funding level
becomes the basis for the course's approved training program
in that fiscal year. [Ref. 22:p. 21-7]
When the review process is completed, DCSPER
publishes the Total Army training requirements and the
approved training programs in the ARPRINT (Army Program for
Individual Training) which becomes the training base line.
ARPRINT provides, by fiscal year, projected individual
training requirements for new and established courses. The
ARPRINT is then used as justification to ensure resources
(money, manpower, facilities, equipment and ammunition) are
available to train the required number of soldiers. Based on
the ARPRINT requirements, the schools and training centers
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develop class schedules for each course. The course schedules
are incorporated into ATRRS, reviewed by TRADOC for adequacy
and policy compliance and then made available to the detailers
or assignment officers. [Ref. 22:p. 21-7,8]
c. Training Program Execution
Army assignment officers or detailers have only one
concern related to TDY en route training - - whether or not a
quota is available in a course. If a quota has made it into
ATRRS, funds are available to support the training. No funds,
no quotas. Overbooking of classes is discouraged as it is
costly; the student must be paid full per diem while waiting
for the next class. [Ref. 27]
Training program changes during the execution year
are managed by the TRAP (Training Requirements Arbitration
Panel) . TRAPs are convened monthly with the first TRAP for a
new fiscal year meeting in the preceding February. The
initial TRAP reviews transactions such as training increases,
reductions, trades and execution problems. Requests for
increases will be evaluated first for trade-offs among input
agencies. If trades cannot be made, the schools and training
centers are asked if they can absorb the increases without
additional resources. Training decreases will also be
examined as possible trade-off commodities to offset
increases. [Ref. 26:pp. 9-10]
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3.
Army' s Management of Training Fund Decreases
Because of the ATRRS system, the Army detailers do not
deal with training dollars but training quotas. If training
fund decreases occur, cuts are handled in a top-down method.
TRADOC, the MACOMs and PERSCOM work with the schools and
training centers to identify classes which are being
underutilized. The needed cost savings are then realized by
shortening the length of the class sessions or canceling class
convenings. These savings are subsequently reflected in a
decreased number of quotas available in ATRRS to the
detailers. [Ref. 31]
4. Additional Benefits of ATRRS
The Army has realized several indirect benefits from
the ATRRS system. Before the Army included all DoD courses
and training provided to non-Army personnel, the other
services were reluctant to reimburse the Army for training
received. Now, ATRRS documents the number of seats DoD and
other sources desire and associated reimbursements can be
calculated. This capability may become critical under DBOF
where the services will be working on a self-sufficient basis.
[Ref. 23]
ATRRs also has features which can be readily
appreciated by the soldier. It can translate the transcript
of a soldier's service training into equivalent college
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credits. Additionally, ATRRS notifies the GI Bill program of
the service member's eligibility. [Ref. 23]
The final benefit of ATRRS is effective program
management. The Army can now maximize its class seat
utilization. It compresses a vast number of training requests
into something more realistic and executable. ATRRS provides
an accurate training program for both planning and budgeting
and offers a means to compare projections against historical
data. The Army has also realized increased efficiencies
because of ATRRS world-wide computer bulletin board
capability. The Army's training system truly runs on a real-
time basis. [Ref. 23]
B. AIR FORCE'S TDY- TO -SCHOOL PROGRAM
The Air Force's "TDY to School" program is a centrally
managed account monitored by the Air Training Command (ATC)
Headquarters at Randolph AFB in San Antonio. AF Regulation
50-22, which provides the governing policy for the program,
states that TDY to School will provide "formal training when
other types of training (ancillary, on-the-job training
programs, and so forth) will not satisfy the requirement."
[Ref. 32:p. 1]
TDY- to- School differs from TEMDUINS in that it gives both
travel and transportation funds in support of training where
TEMDUINS only pays per diem. The guidance also notes that
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because TDY- to-School funding is limited, training must be
done at minimum TDY cost. [Ref. 32 :p. 1]
1. The Scope of the TDY-to -School Program
Air Force's TDY- to-School Program promotes several
different types of training:
• Air Force Directed Training




• MAJCOM (Major Command2 ) Training
The Air Force has established that two training
categories will take precedence over all other training
requests. The first priority is Air Force directed training
which is considered mission essential. This training retrains
military personnel who are changing rates or being phased out
of one aircraft and into another. The second priority is
contractor-provided training such as on-site training in
flight simulators or for systems maintenance. Pressure is on
the Air Force to ensure all such contractor training is
utilized in an effort to maximize the use of funds. [Ref. 33]
2 Major Commands are roughly equivalent to Navy's Warfare
Program Managers and major claimants. MAJCOMs include:
Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Military Airlift
Command, Electronics Systems Command, Special Operations, and
Air Training Command.
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2. TDY- to-School Program Overview
Each year, MAJCOMs send personnel to courses for
specialized skill training. The purpose is to provide "skills
and knowledge needed to perform at an advanced skill level or
in a supervisory position and usually related to an Air Force
specialty." Instruction usually follows the member's initial
pipeline training after the member has gained experience by
working in their specialty. [Ref. 32 :p. 2]
Funds for Air Force's TDY- to-School Program are
"programmed for three years in advance of the current fiscal
year to coincide with the Air Force's PPBS (Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System)." For example, in FY-1991
operating year, the resources for FY- 1992 (budget year) have
already been identified by prior planning and programming
actions, and FY- 1993 requirements are being programmed. [Ref.
32:p. 2]
The TDY- to-School Program's success revolves around
the interactions of four main participants:
Accurate planning for their training requirements by the
MAJCOMS
.
Effective administration of training resources by the
Headquarters, Air Training Command.
Programming and support of training requirements in the
PPBS by the Headquarters, Air Force/MPPT (Military
Personnel Program, Training). [Ref. 32:p. 2]
Support of the program through the TMS by Headquarters,
Air Force Military Personnel Command. [Ref. 34]
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3. Identifying TDY- to-School Requirements and Building
the Plan
Requirements for the TDY- to-School program are
gathered from the MAJCOMs and their subordinates through the
TDY- to- School Programming Plan (TSPP) . Through the TSPP, the
MAJCOM can communicate the quotas needed by weapon system, the
training priority and total fiscal year requirements. The
TSPP then establishes training needs and serves as a basis for
programming and budgeting ATC- funded MAJCOM TDY- to-School
instruction. [Ref. 26:p. 3]
TSPP requirements are forwarded up from the individual
units to the air base Commanding Officer. They are then sent
to the MAJCOMs for screening, prioritizing and further
consolidation. The MAJCOMs also incorporate any additional
individual training requirements of which they are aware [Ref.
35] . The data is ultimately submitted to the ATC by 1
November each year [Ref. 26 :p. 3] through the TMS terminals at
the MAJCOMs [Ref. 34].
Headquarters, United States Air Force (HQ, USAF) adds
Air Force directed training to the TSPP compilation [Ref.
35] . The TSPP is forwarded to ATC for validation and approval
in accordance with Headquarters, Air Force/MPPT training
policy. ATC provides HQ, USAF/MPPT a summary of TDY- to-School
requirements and utilization data from the TSPP who uses the
information to program and budget TDY- to-School funds. [Ref.
26:p. 2]
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4. Integrating Budgeting with the TDY- to-School
Requirements
a. Establishing the Budget
The ATC at Randolph Air Force Base coordinates the
annual requirements screening process (TSPP) via the Training
Management System (TMS) . Each year, Air Force holds a
training requirements meetings where functional managers
(similar to Navy's Program Managers) each project their
training needs, by month and quarter. At the same time, they
assign training priorities within each functional area. [Ref
.
33] The MAJCOM representatives enter the resulting data
directly into TMS which is then retrieved and analyzed by the
ATC and passed to HQ, USAF/MPPT [Ref. 35].
While the ATC is coordinating and developing the
TDY- to School Plan, program budget requirements are also being
estimated by the Training Programs Division at HQ, USAF/MPPT.
The TDY- to-School funds are then passed to ATC for execution
in their annual Financial Plan (FINPLAN) . [Ref. 36] The
FINPLAN is analogous to the Operating Budget Authorization
provided to a Navy claimant by NAVCOMPT.
When changes are made to an Air Force platform, the
acquisition process helps identify the related training needs.
The System Program Office (SPO) creates a System Training Plan
(STP) for the acquisition project. The STP is sent to ATC who
disseminates it to the Training Service Officer (TSO) for
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review and chop. Based on the TSO's feedback, the ATC then
incorporates the requirement into the FINPLAN. [Ref. 35]
Although the FINPLAN lays out a spending profile in
standard budget categories, the funds are actually passed in
a lump sum. ATC has ultimate execution authority over that
funding and how it will be used, irrespective of the FINPLAN.
The impact of this system is that changes to ATC's
priorities and circumstances may result in the diversion of
funds away from TDY- to- School . Also, although a total of $32
million was available at ATC in FY- 1990, it had to be used for
both TDY- to-School costs plus ATC's own administrative travel
and Mobile Team Trainer expenses. [Ref. 35]
Jb. Requirements vs. Resources
Like TEMDUINS, TDY- to- School ' s major problem is one
of funding, where the training requested by the field units
exceeds the funds available to support it. The Air Force
assumes it will train about 5.5% of its military end strength
when estimating the amount of TDY- to-School funds needed,
allowing roughly $1200.00 per training quota per year. [Ref.
33]
While approximating is an efficient budgeting tool,
the resulting prediction is less than what the field units say
they need [Ref. 33]. Last year, Air Force field activities
proposed training requirements of over 50,000 quotas valued at
$64 million, but in actuality about 25,000 personnel were
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trained. In years past, MAJCOM requirements have been
projected as high as 84,000 quotas. [Ref. 35] This
underscores the difficulty the Air Force is experiencing in
validating the submitted training requirements, which has led
to a credibility gap between the field activities and the
Headquarters. The feeling at Headquarters is that often field
units submit a training x wishlist' vice their bare bones
requirements. As a result, the field's assessment of training
requirements mushrooms. [Ref. 33]
To cover the deficiency between requirements and
funding, ATC sets priorities for "funded" or must -pay
training. As mentioned previously, the two highest categories
are Air Force directed and contractor-provided training. [Ref.
32 :p. 1] The Air Force assignment personnel (detailers)
notify ATC how many quotas they will need in these two
categories for the upcoming year. The remaining quotas are
available for distribution throughout the Air Force. ATC
retains control of the funds but earmarks the quotas for the
designated users. [Ref. 36]
Remaining funds (or quotas) are allocated back out
to the MAJCOMs on a pro- rated basis. Roughly 75 percent of
the TDY- to -School quotas (and funds) are shared among the
MAJCOMs. The last 25 percent goes to any remaining commands
with training requirements. If the Air Force lacks TDY-to-
School resources, the must -pay quotas are protected and
shortages are taken from the funds reserved for the MAJCOMS.
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Commands are also queried quarterly to see how their
requirements compare to resources available in an effort to
realign and maximize funds. [Ref . 35]
MAJCOMS also may fund TDY- to -School training ATC
cannot afford. If seating capacity allows, the MAJCOM can
provide ATC accounting data to cite on the member's PCS
(Permanent Change of Station) orders to cover the travel and
per diem costs. The caveat is that the MAJCOM must provide
the appropriate "color" of money, i.e., Operations and
Maintenance, Budget Activity 8 funds. While this option is
available, the MAJCOM more frequently funds training for the
member on a TDY- and- return basis after they report to their
unit. [Ref. 36]
5. Problems with TDY- to- School
The Air Force has encountered some problems relating
to the TDY- to- School program. Cuts in training funds have
emphasized the need for changes in the program as documented
by letters sent up by the MAJCOMS to the Headquarters, saying
that decreased TDY- to- School training is now affecting combat
readiness. [Ref. 35]
What factors have contributed to the program's funding
shortfall? First, TDY- to-School funds are not fenced for
that program's exclusive use. For example, the FY-1991 $32
million TDY- to-School budget covers several categories of
travel, not just TDY- to-School . If more pressing dollar
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requirements emerge, ATC can (and has) pulled money from the
program. The resulting loss to TDY- to- School has been
significant at times, representing up to a 25 percent program
reduction. [Ref. 35]
It is important to note that ATC is not insensitive to
the impact its actions have on TDY- to -School; the program is
simply overcome by events. As a result, the TDY- to- School
program has come to bank on fiscal year end "fall out"
resources to get through the execution year. There is
concern, however, that such windfalls may be "history" in
light of DoD's current lean funding levels. [Ref. 35]
Another problem the Air Force has found is that the
TDY- to- School training requirements submitted to the ATC are
not scrubbed as closely as possible. It appears that "gold
plating" or nice-to-have requests are being proposed with
essential training requirements. Also, as training in the Air
Force isn't centralized, costly duplications and overlaps have
occurred in the past. [Ref. 35]
6. TDY- to- School' s Future
Changes are coming into play for the Air Force's TDY-
to- School program. As mentioned above, the provision was made
in fiscal year 1990 for the MAJCOMs (with ATC approval) to use
their own unit's Budget Activity 8 O&M funds to support their
training needs. This is similar to the Navy's TDY- and- return
concept, whereby the member goes from his duty station to
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class and back using the duty station's travel funds. [Ref.
35]
There is also an initiative being promoted to totally
decentralize the TDY- to-School program, passing all training
funds and responsibilities down to the MAJCOMs . The feeling
is that if the MAJCOMS controlled the funds, visibility for
basic, "non-sexy" training would be increased. An office
would be established at Headquarters or ATC to serve as the
facilitator between the MAJCOMs, who would be supplying
training funds, and the detailers, who would be citing those
funds on PCS orders. This concept is still just a proposal,
as the Vice Chief of the Air Force has yet to support it.
[Ref. 35]
ATC is also searching for a way to validate training
requirements and find a more effective use of quotas.
Historically, about 4-5 percent of the MAJCOMs manpower has
been trained each year. This figure has been used for
planning purposes but has no basis other than historical data.
The Air Force Comptroller is supporting the validation effort
based on his own requirement to establish unit costs. The
Comptroller's hope is to develop a generic cost per graduate
output rate with the costs being summarized by base and by
course. [Ref. 35]
Some of the motivation behind developing the TDY- to-
School cost rate is from DBOF where the training commands will
be vying with outside competitors for local command training
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dollars. In many cases, the local commands will now be free
to go to the best training source be it Air Force, DoD or a
commercial vendor. As a matter of survival, the Air Force
must then fully establish its TDY-to-School unit costs. [Ref.
35]
C. The Marine Corps' Training En Route Program
1. Training Input Plan
The Training Input Plan is the backbone of the Marine
Corps' en route training program as it represents the
compilation of all Corps training requirements. The
Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (CGMCCDC) requests data for the Input Plan from
Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) by letter. [Ref. 37]
HQMC promulgates the data call down the chain of
command and consolidates the responses. HQMC also correlates
the submitted training requests against the projected Corps'
force structure, which changes frequently. [Ref. 38] The
information is sent back to CGMCCDC then passed to the
Director of the Marine Corps Air Ground Training and Education
Center (MAGTAC) , one of its subordinate offices. The staff at
MAGTAC uses the Corps' feedback to develop outyear POM
training requirements and also refines the Input Plan to align
it with funds available for the execution year. The final
current year Input Plan represents the Corps' funded training
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quotas and contains specific course data such as course title
and seat information. [Ref. 37]
The Input Plan is returned to HQMC, via CGMCCDC, for
implementation. HQMC gives it to the Corps' monitors
(detailers) to use in planning upcoming PCS orders. The Input
Plan only delineates courses and quotas available to the
monitors, however. Funding authority for training is provided
separately through the Training Quota Memorandum (TQM) . [Ref.
38]
2 . Training Quota Memorandum (TQM)
The Training Quota Memorandum (TQM) furnishes the
monitors with accounting codes to be cited on member's PCS
orders to support their en route training. The Job Order
Numbers in the accounting codes are course- specif ic with the
differences noted in the last three digits of the code. The
advantage of this system is that it possesses an inherent
"free" management tool. Based on the unique Job Order
Numbers, the MAGTAC can monitor TQM obligations and
expenditures using routinely generated reports from DoD's
central accounting centers. This has eliminated the immediate
need for a specialized data base system to monitor the Corps'
training en route program. [Ref. 38]
3 . Integrating the TQM and Input Plan
How are the Input Plan and the TQM related? The
Corps' training requirements are initially identified through
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the Input Plan. The Input Plan helps increase the visibility
of training-associated factors such as school house capacity,
the projected training requirements themselves, history of
seats funded, historical quota use and program shortfalls,
which may impact quota estimates. Previous quota cost
estimates are adjusted for student "no- shows" and attrites.
The Input Plan is costed out using the updated estimates and
becomes the foundation for the TQM. [Ref. 38]
Based on the refined cost per quota, the MAGTAC
compares the Input Plan requests and funds available for the
fiscal year. If the quotas requested exceed the resources,
the number of seats bought is reduced. Deletion decisions are
based on course priorities reflecting the Corps' mission
requirements. The resulting funded quotas are reflected in
the final Input Plan MAGTAC sends back to HQMC. [Ref. 38]
4 . Outyear Planning
As noted previously, the Input Plan provides the
Corps' training requirements reflected in both their execution
year and outyear POM budgets. The Marines are similar to the
other services in that they do not always succeed in gaining
POM for unfunded training requirements. However, the funding
problems have frequently healed themselves during the
execution year as the monitors usually do not execute what was
requested in the Input Plan. [Ref 39]
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Like the Navy, the Marines try to manage within the
dollars they have been provided in the POM. Prior to FY- 90,
there were sufficient funds to cover the entire Training Plan.
The POM was written using both the Input Plan and the
monitor's feedback on training needs. The monitors would help
in the process by prioritizing the requirements into training
segments such as MOS specialty training as the first priority,
recruiter training as second, and security/professional
development last. [Ref. 38]
Since FY- 90, however, the Marines' program has begun
to resemble the Navy's TEMDUINS with its decreased level of
funding. Prioritizing training has become a much more serious
endeavor with MAGTAC recently initiating the decisions. [Ref.
38]
While emerging requirements are usually dealt with
through prioritization or seeking additional resources, new
training initiatives tied to acquisition have other support.
When a new weapon system is fielded, some training is normally
provided with the acquisition itself. In the Marine Corps,
the proponent for a new initiative, such as a weapons system
or platform, pays for any associated training until the effort
is incorporated in the training POM. During POM, the emerging
requirement will be submitted as an unfunded item unless the
proponent antes up for it. If it is not bought in the POM,
reductions must then be made to either accommodate the new
training or delete it. [Ref. 38] The Marines also usually
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experience funding shortages when phasing between old and new
systems due to the overlap in training [Ref . 39] . The Navy-
has experienced similar problems which are often exacerbated
if there is any delay in the transition process.
5. Executing the Marine's En Route Training Program
The Corps' monitors rely on the Input Plan for
information and the TQM for funding when writing member's
orders. As the Marines' program is currently operating, the
monitors manage their training dollars by managing the number
of quotas they are assigned in the Input Plan. Like the Army,
the monitors can make assignments to the schools by name.
Actually, the monitor's reservation must have a name
associated with it by a specific cut-off date or the
reservation will fall through and the quota is available for
use by other monitors. [Ref. 38]
6. Problems associated with the Marines' Program
Unlike the Navy and other services, the Marines
conduct a minimal amount of training internally and rely
heavily upon training provided by the other services to meet
their needs. While the Corps' does cut costs by operating
fewer training sites, they must offset it with training en
route to various non-Marine activities. This puts increased
emphasis on adequately funding their training program from the
beginning through the POM. [Ref. 38]
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Like their sister service, the Navy, the Marines have
come to rely upon offsetting funds becoming available in the
execution year to cover any shortages. With diminishing




In examining the Navy's sister services' management of
their TDY en route training programs, some similarities can be
seen. Common to all the military services is an increased
sensitivity to DoD's declining budget and the impact on
service programs. The two larger services, the Army and the
Air Force, have come to rely on automated systems to define
and manage training requirements. The resulting data is
subsequently used in the budget process. Due to its small
size, the Marine Corps has not developed a computer system to
track its training program. Instead, the Marines have
modified their accounting data to take advantage of existing
DoD systems.
Decreases in DoD's budget base occurring as a result of
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 will have an equally harsh
impact on all the services, making it important to consider
every avenue available to maximize the use of funds.
Training, unfortunately, is often one of the first victims
when funds are limited. To justify funding for TEMDUINS, the
Navy would be well advised to follow the other services' lead
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and establish an automated system to support TEMDUINS . The
next chapter will examine the TEMDUINS program from a
management control system approach.
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V. MANAGEMENT CONTROL THEORY AND THE CURRENT TEMDUINS
PROGRAM
"In all organizations, even the tiniest, there is an
activity called management control." [Ref. 40:p. 3] The
purpose of this chapter is to describe management controls
used in operating budgets. A comparison will be made between
one control theory and the management of Navy's TEMDUINS
program.
A. DEFINING MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS
"Management control is the process by which managers
influence other members of the organization to implement the
organization's strategies." [Ref. 40 :p. 10] As seen by this
definition, all organizations perform management control
functions even if they are not formally recognized. Controls
serve as the means by which we head towards an objective.
"They keep us from veering off in undesirable directions and
prevent unwanted things (from) happening." [Ref. 4l:p. 2]
Schick describes management control as "the process by
which managers assure that resources are obtained and used
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the
organization's objective." [Ref. 42 :p. 17] Effectiveness is
situation- specif ic and means "doing the job you want or
promised to do." Efficient performance reflects "doing your
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job with a minimum use of resources" or generating the maximum
possible output using a given amount of resources [Ref . 43: pp.
5-6] .
1. Basic Divisions in Management Control Systems
Management control systems contain both a structure
and a process: structure is what the system is, and process
is what it does [Ref. 44:p. 231]. The control structure
primarily consists of specifying which managers are
responsible for which resources in the organization [Ref.
44:p. 233]. The closer the match of the responsible parties
to the control structure, the easier it will be to implement
a good management control system [Ref. 44 :p. 235] . The focus
of this chapter, however, will be on the management control
process vice the structure as it more closely relates to the
subject of this thesis.
2. Management Control System Characteristics
Anthony and Young have identified five general
characteristics common to all management control systems:
A Total System - It embraces all aspects of the
organization's operation.
Goal Congruence - The system leads individuals to take
actions that are in the best interest of the organization
and its goals.
Financial Framework - This is the core of the management
control system where amounts are stated in monetary terms.
Rhythm - The control process follows a definite pattern
and timetable, month after month and year after year.
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Integration - The system is coordinated and integrated so
data collected for any purpose can be reconciled with
other system data. [Ref. 44:pp. 13-14]
B. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS PROCESS FOR OPERATING
ACTIVITIES
Management control activities fall into two general
categories - those for unique special projects and those for
the control of ongoing operations such as TEMDUINS . Due to
its applicability to TEMDUINS, attention will be centered on
operating activity controls.
The management control system process for operating
activities consists of four subprocesses which follow one
another in a prescribed sequence. These subprocesses are:
programming, budget preparation, execution and evaluation.
[Ref. 40:p. 15]
1 . Programming
Ramanathan has described programming as the "process
of subcontracting between top and middle management for the
purpose of specific accomplishment within each program." [Ref.
43 :p. 409] In a definition that is closer to the Navy's
operations, Anthony explains programming as "the process of
deciding on the programs that the organization will undertake
and the approximate amount of resources that will be allocated
to each programming." [Ref. 40 :p. 15]
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Programming usually is done annually for a span of
five years, as beyond that time, the future is "so murky that
attempts to make a long-range plan for a longer period are not
worthwhile." Because of the relatively long time horizon,
only rough estimates are feasible. [Ref. 44 :p. 83]
"Programs should be developed to meet a particular
goal or objective." [Ref. 45 :p. 153] A goal is a broad
statement of the organization's intent, the main purpose of
which is to communicate the organization's aims and
priorities. An objective is one of a set of steps leading to
the achievement of an organization's goals, indicating a
specific result to be achieved within a certain time frame.
[Ref. 45 :p. 112] "A realistic and comprehensive appraisal of
the past performance and continuing potential of each existing
program is an essential element in the programming cycle . "
[Ref. 43 :p. 410] Lacking a concrete performance measure such
as profit, program decisions in nonprofit organizations are
often "based on judgment and are influenced by the persuasive
abilities of program advocates and by political and other
considerations." [Ref. 44 :p. 11]
Preparing the program's long-range plan normally
involves two cycles. Rough guidelines and general assumptions
about the future are agreed to in the first cycle. In the
second cycle, these are used to prepare the long-range plan.
[Ref. 44 :p. 15] While final decisions are made by senior
personnel, the major responsibility for programming is
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assigned to program- level and other middle managers. Their
knowledge and personal experience are crucial for analyzing
the potentials and problems in current programs and in
proposing innovations. [Ref. 43 :p. 424]
The first cut at the program's plan usually reveals a
"planning gap." In a nonprofit entity, the gap indicates that
estimated expenses exceed estimated revenues and other sources
of funds. [Ref. 40 :p. 84] Making choices among alternative
courses of actions can be difficult because the relationship
between costs and benefits and even the amount of benefits are
hard to measure in nonprofit organizations [Ref. 40:p. 85].
Programming is challenging for two reasons. First,
differing expectations in the organization produce an
inhibiting effect (organizational friction) which can impede
results and increase costs. With the natural tendency of
large bureaucracies to operate rather slowly, internal
friction created by differing individual objectives can slow
their progress almost to a standstill. [Ref. 46:pp. 30-31]
Second, participants may employ the tactic of
globality to avoid confrontation during programming. Details
of disagreements are ignored and objectives are discussed
instead in broad global terms. Agreements are easily
achieved, but, when the "agreed" objectives must be
implemented, "the specifics again become important, and
organizational friction reappears." [Ref. 46 :p. 32]
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2 . Budgeting
Gambino describes a budget as "the detailed,
quantified, objective plan for attaining an organization's
goals," stated in fiscal language for a fixed period of time
[Ref. 45:p. 21]. Some analysts see budgeting as the
"fine tuning" of the program for a given year,
incorporating the final decisions on the amounts to be
spent for each program, and making clear who is
responsible for carrying out each part of the program.
[Ref. 44:p. 358]
In reality, however, no such clean separation between
programming and budgeting exists, nor can it exist since
additional program decisions often surface as part of
budgeting. The two processes are distinct, however. The
purpose of the programming process is to make decisions about
programs, while the purpose of budgeting is to decide on the
actual operations plan for a year. [Ref. 44 :p. 358]
The budget serves as an important control device in a
nonprofit organization. It is a useful tool for developing
and communicating some of the principal measures by which
performance will be evaluated. Later, the same budgetary tool
is the basis for measuring the degree to which the
organization's goals have been attained. Thus, the budget
"lends an aura of responsibility both for one's development of
the plan and adherence to that plan." [Ref. 47:p. 3] Budgets
have an additional control function in government
organizations as the "amounts appropriated in accordance with
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the budget cannot be legally exceeded and violators are
subject to criminal penalties." [Ref. 44 :p. 427]
While upper management is the strongest force in
programming, lower levels of management are the key players in
the budget preparation process. As Anthony and Young have
noted:
If budgets are imposed without such participation,
managers feel no commitment to attain the objectives.
Participation starts at the lowest level in the
organization. [Ref. 44 :p. 90]
The budget then represents a bilateral commitment
between a manager and their superior on expected performance,
subject to the implied qualification "unless actual conditions
are different from those assumed in the budget." In other
words, the approved budget gives managers the authority to
carry out the program, but also makes them responsible for
doing so within the stated amounts. [Ref. 44 :p. 90]
Research has shown that budget formats are important.
Procedures are not neutral as "the means of budgeting somehow
affects the ends of budgeting." [Ref. 46 :p. 12] However, no
perfect budget structure has been found that will meet the
needs of every organization at every period in its existence.
Certain elements have been found to be helpful to any budget
structure:
It must have a program structure to relate results to
resources
.
It must link not only resources to results but also
personnel to results.
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• It must articulate the results to be achieved and the way
in which those results will be measured.
• It should involve officials and employees in the decision
process at appropriate levels.
• It must have line item control features and should link to
the accounting system.
• It must be practical to implement. [Ref. 46 :p. 26]
Three major problems have been noted in budgeting.
First, upper management's primary concern is usually financial
solvency so increased emphasis is placed on financial rather
than performance budgeting. The effect is that those
executing the budget may not appreciate how their respective
roles integrate into the goals and objectives of the
organization, which decreases their motivation to perform
effectively. [Ref. 43:p. 491]
Second, actual performance will often deviate from the
plan due to basic uncertainties in the budget process.
"Unless corrective actions are taken in time, such deviations
tend to persist, and their cumulative effects frustrate the
goals and objectives of the organization." [Ref. 43 :p. 493]
Three elements are needed to take effective corrective action:
(1) timely information on actual performance, (2) correlating
actual performance with budgets and plans and (3) analysis of
the deviations between actual and planned performance. [Ref.
43:p. 546]
The third problem is one inherent to appropriated
funds. As appropriations for operating purposes usually lapse
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at the end of a fiscal year, there is a natural tendency not
to permit appropriated funds to go unused. [Ref . 44 :p. 427]
"While the encumbrance accounting system is designed to avoid
spending more than the amount appropriated; in practice, it
also discourages spending less than the among appropriated."
[Ref. 44:p. 428]
3 . Execution
"The budget preparation process lays the groundwork
for the control of operations, often referred to as 'program
execution'." [Ref. 40:p. 91] The budget is a device for
coordinating the activity's actions, but it is only a guide
for the manager:
If a better way of achieving objectives is discovered, or
if conditions change from those observed in the budget,
the manager should depart from the budget .. .Adherence to
the budget is not necessarily good, and departure from it
is not necessarily bad. [Ref. 40 :p. 92]
The budget may or may not be revised if circumstances
change during execution. Differing views have emerged
concerning budget revisions. Some analysts feel that the
budget no longer reflects planned performance unless it is
revised. Others argue that revisions destroy the basis for
analyzing difference between actual and budgeted performance.
A compromise is to maintain the original budget but
"periodically to prepare a 'current estimate' to show the
revised estimate of performance." [Ref. 40:p. 93]
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The main control activity during budget execution is
task control, where managers ensure specific tasks are carried
out effectively and efficiently [Ref. 40:p. 12]. But,
managers cannot literally "control costs." Instead, they
attempt to influence the actions of the people responsible for
incurring costs [Ref. 40:p. 92].
"Task control is transaction- oriented; that is, it
involves the control of individual tasks." Task control
consists of seeing to it that the rules prescribed as part of
the management control process are being followed. Tasks
performed by professionals do not fit the standard rules
provided by management as much of their work is not routine.
Nevertheless, it does tend to be repetitive and general
guidelines for even those tasks can usually be developed.
[Ref. 40:p. 37]
During execution, information is critically needed by
management for task control. Operating performance data will
alert management about the potential need for corrective
action. This information should reach the manager quickly
enough to enable him to act, and it should be structured so
problem areas are highlighted [Ref. 40:p. 93]. Managers act
based on both informal (e.g., observation, conversation) and
formal (reports, documents) information, the purpose of which
is to alert them to the possible need for corrective action
[Ref. 40 :p. 93] . "The frequency with which reports of actual
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performance are prepared depends on the manager's ability to
take corrective action if it is needed." [Ref. 40:p. 94]
There should be a means of quickly notifying the
manager of events related to the activity's critical success
factors. The structure of these ad hoc reports should
emphasize these factors and provide information about them as
quickly as possible. [Ref. 40:p. 93] Summary information
should be backed up by detailed information to facilitate the
search for causes of variances in important items on the
regular reports [Ref. 40:p. 94].
Many nonprofit organizations are extremely concerned
about budget execution, in that if actual expenditures fall
under budget, it may be a signal to the funding sources and
others that the budget for next year could be cut safely.
"Because efficient performance that results in expenses being
less than budget is, in effect, penalized, the tendency exists
at many nonprofit organizations to ensure that the entire
budget is expended." [Ref. 45 :p. 152]
4 . Reporting and Evaluation
Regular budget reports serve a variety of purposes,
such as: (1) a basis for action (if warranted), (2) a way to
coordinate and control the organization's current activities,
(3) a tool for evaluating operating performance and (4) the
means for program evaluation [Ref. 40 :p. 97]
.
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Budget evaluation closes the loop in the management
control system. Evaluating actual budget performance can lead
back to program revision, budget revision or a change in
operations. Evaluation may also make management reconsider
the organization's strategies for achieving its goals. [Ref.
44:p. 12]
Evaluation has been called an "attempt to determine
whether programs are achieving the results for which they were
authorized and for which funds were made available." It is
difficult to determine how well a nonprofit organization is
meeting its goals because their outputs are often intangible.
Yet, finding an appropriate evaluation system is becoming
increasingly important to meet the public's demand for
improved nonprofit organization accountability. [Ref. 45:pp.
111-2]
Anthony and Young recommend classifying output for
evaluation according to what it is supposed to measure. Three
categories have emerged: results measures, process measures
and social indicators. [Ref. 44 :p. 468]
Results measures express output in terms related in
some way to the organization's objectives, either directly or
through a surrogate measure, to indicate operational
effectiveness. [Ref. 45 :p. 117] Using TEMDUINS as an example,
a primary objective of the program is to provide per diem for
en route NEC-producing training between permanent duty
stations. A surrogate results measure of this objective would
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be the total number TEMDUINS' recipients who earned an NEC in
a year.
Process measures reflect the "activity conducted by
the organization." [Ref. 45 :p. 117] The focus is upon
measuring efficiency, but not effectiveness [Ref. 44:p. 469].
Results and process measures differ in that results measures
are "ends oriented" while process measures are "means
oriented." Anthony and Young explain:
An ends -oriented indicator is a direct measure of success
in achieving an objective. A means -oriented indicator is
a measure of what a responsibility center or individual
does. [Ref. 44:p. 468]
Process and results measures must be related to ensure
effective performance [Ref. 44:p. 469]. For example, TEMDUINS
could use the number of enlisted personnel receiving per diem
under the program in a year as a process measure. Yet a
result measure is needed to validate that essential or NEC-
producing training was provided.
Social indicators "usually relate to overall
objectives rather than specific activities of an organization.
Since the cause-effect relationship is not clear, these
indicators are difficult to use properly ." [Ref. 45:p. 117]
These indicators have been found to been so heavily influenced
by external factors that they are of little use in day-to-day
management [Ref. 44:p. 471]. For example, Pers-463 uses an
average daily per diem rate when estimating the amount of
TEMDUINS funds required for a fiscal year based on a given
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training requirement. But the average per diem rate is
affected during the execution year by several unpredictable,
external factors, such as government quarters availability,
changes in room rate charges and changes in the length of a
course due to weather conditions.
When selecting which output measures to use, some
important considerations include:
• Some measure of output is usually better than none.
• If feasible, relate output measures to measures available
from outside sources.
• Use measures that can be reported in a timely manner.
• Develop different measures for different purposes.
• Focus on important measures.
• Don't report more information than is likely to be used.
• If feasible, tie output measures to expense measures.
• Don't give more credence to surrogates than is warranted.
[Ref. 44:pp. 478-9]
Reports and evaluation serve two key purposes;
feedback and feedforward. As noted by Ramanathan:
Feedback (reporting the effectiveness of current
performance) and feedforward (reporting the potential
impacts of current deviations of future plans and
performance) are the twin aims of monitoring performance.
[Ref. 43:p. 564]
But reports alone do not guarantee that feedback and
feedforward will occur. The reports must be discussed at the
correct levels, explanation and analysis must be provided by
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responsible individuals and corrective action identified and
implemented. [Ref. 43 :p. 564]
Certain difficulties have been associated with reports
and evaluations. By their nature, reports focus on the
current period but the current period results are influenced
by decisions made in earlier periods [Ref. 40:p. 16]. Since
evaluation occurs after the event, it literally cannot affect
what has happened [Ref. 40:p. 95].
However, formal reports alone do not meet all the
needs of management control. Informal information gained
through conversations, memos or meetings is also critical.
When important news is conveyed as soon as possible
informally, formal reports will hold no surprises. [Ref. 40 :p.
95] However, too much information can also be
counterproductive. Excess data is either ignored or under-
utilized. This obstacle can be overcome by involving the
managers in designing the reports, to customize them for their
interests. [Ref. 43:p. 566]
The original budget was based on certain assumptions
about conditions that would exist during execution.
Logically, allowances for changed circumstances should be made
but many evaluators tend to hold subordinates accountable for
uncontrollable changes. [Ref. 40 :p. 96]
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C. EXAMINING TEMDUINS' MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
If everyone always did what was best for their
organization, management controls would never be needed.
Merchant has found that management controls provide the means
to ensure that plans made by the organization are carried out
or modified if necessary [Ref. 41:p. 43]. Characteristics of
"good" management control systems include:
• Orientation towards the future,
• Consideration of dimensions and facets of the system,
• Recognizing that assessment of success is hard and subjec-
tive, and
• Realizing that 'good' control is not always economically
feasible. [Ref. 41:p. 44]
In the section above, the management control system for
operating activities was described as having four phases:
programming, budgeting, execution, reports and evaluation.
Following is a comparison of Navy's TEMDUINS program to this
management control concept.
1 . Programming
The appropriations budget is the one most commonly
used by government agencies whereby a fund sets an upper limit
to financial expenditures allowed a specific activity during
the fiscal year [Ref. 48:p. 125]. Our history of Continuing
Resolutions is evidence of the time required to pass an
appropriation. But, the appropriation is just a step in an
even longer process -- the budget cycle for a Navy program.
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The Operations and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) budget
for a naval program or activity has a life span of ten years.
Initial action commences five years before the execution
fiscal year through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) POM (Program Objective Memorandum) process. The
transition from programming to budgeting occurs during the
President's Biennial Budget submissions. Then, before the
appropriation lapses, the funds are available for another
three years to cover any legal expenditures remaining.
Programming goals or objectives for Navy programs,
such as TEMDUINS, can be viewed from several perspectives:
that of the major claimant, the Resource Sponsor, the major
claimant and those tasked with budget execution.
a. Bureau of Naval Personnel (Pers-02) , TEMDUINS'
Major Claimant
The financial management objectives of the major
claimant, BUPERS (Pers-02), include:
• Obtain for and administer material assets to the TEMDUINS
budget execution office, BUPERS (Pers-463). In the case
of TEMDUINS, the assets are 0&M,N funds. For other Navy
programs, the assets may be funds, manpower, capital
equipment, property and consumables.
• Coordinate, evaluate and submit short and long term
TEMDUINS budget requests to NAVCOMPT and/or the Resource
Sponsors
.
• Oversee Pers-463 's compliance with administrative and
legal constraints. The most critical concern is
conformance with 10 U.S.C. Titles 1301 (misuse of




• Maintain the "big picture" perspective of their own and
TEMDUINS' roles in the Navy's overall mission of national
defense.
b. Chief of Naval Operations (OP-120C) , TEMDUINS'
Resource Sponsor
The Resource Sponsor's objectives are similar to
the claimant's in that they are concerned with:
• Analyzing the claimant's input for the TEMDUINS program's
long term budget and forwarding to the next level for
approval
.
• Protecting TEMDUINS' financial interests to the maximum
extent possible in the face of major reductions.
• Maintaining an even "bigger picture" view of their
claimants, their programs and the Navy's total needs.
c. Bureau of Naval Personnel (Pers-203) , TEMDUINS'
Program Manager
The TEMDUINS Program Manager's viewpoint differs
from the claimant and Resource Sponsor, in that his interest
in finance is tempered by his programmatic concerns. The
Program Manager must:
• Monitor the fiscal activity of TEMDUINS to defend budgeted
funds against reduction and ensure that current year funds
are used legally and wisely.
• Provide those responsible for executing the program, Pers-
463, with sufficient guidance and support to meet mission
objectives.
• Be sensitive to future changes in the Navy and DoD which
may impact his program.
d
.
BUPERS (Pers -463) , TEMDUINS ' Program Execu tion
Office
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Program execution offices naturally have a
different perspective of Navy financial management which is
reflected in their objectives:
• Maintain records and prepare reports as required by the
major claimant, Program Manager and other senior commands.
• Submit accurate and timely budget requests to the major
claimant
.
• Scrutinize all obligations and expenditures.
• Comply with applicable Program Manager, Resource Sponsors
and claimant policies and guidelines, plus any applicable
laws
.
• Establish credibility with all interacting parties. Most
important is to have a strong, honest relationship with
the claimant as they are the primary fiscal contact and
the source of funds in the budget years.
• Be thoroughly familiar with the current internal and
external political environment, to better manage
expenditures and build viable budgets.
• Educate personnel in the basics of Navy finance and




A program's 0&M,N budget can be used for control
purposes. The budget functions as a control when the
commitment is made to work within the planned forecast to
achieve an agreed-on outcome. [Ref . 49 :p. 150] TEMDUINS is at
a disadvantage as the program lacks a detailed historical data
base, such as those maintained by the Army and Air Force.
TEMDUINS budget estimates have relied on general
execution historical data and proposed future requirements
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provided by the Program Manager based on information provided
by the Surface Warfare Sponsors in the NTPs . However, because
the Navy does not fund specific courses or quotas as some of
the other services do, neither the TEMDUINS budget analyst or
Pers-463 can develop refined budget estimates or detail the
impact of funding shortfalls.
Control is achieved in the budget process by using
TEMDUINS past budgets and execution profiles to identify in
part their future funding levels. Any increases or decreases
to the program are compared to the yardstick of past
performance. Care is taken not to exceed the funding amount
allowed by NAVCOMPT without offsets being provided.
While the claimant POM budget analyst, the Program
Manager and the Resource Sponsor are the key players during
TEMDUINS' programming phase, the Pers-02 TEMDUINS budget
analyst and Pers-463 budget officer are the main ones involved
in drafting TEMDUINS' current year budgets. The TEMDUINS
budget is then examined by the Program Manager to check for
programmatic consistency before being included in the
claimant's submission to NAVCOMPT.
3 . Execution
The most difficult objective for the TEMDUINS budget
execution office, Pers-463, and the claimant, Pers-02, is
ensuring that adequate funds are available for the program,
and successfully gaining more for unforeseen requirements.
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The execution office has little real control over the amount
of money TEMDUINS will finally receive, and they cannot
generate any revenue to make-up for shortfalls. Pers-02 is in
a similar situation as the funds available to TEMDUINS are
contingent on what is provided to the claimancy by NAVCOMPT.
The best defense both Pers-02 and 463 have is to have
developed accurate budget requests based on realistic
projections of future requirements supported by back-up data.
Also important are records and reports documenting the timely
obligation and expenditure of funds to prove responsible
fiscal management. These two actions will help provide a
basis to support TEMDUINS unfunded requirements in the
execution and future years of the program.
The TEMDUINS Program Manager is only slightly involved
in the program's execution. The guidelines provided each year
are meant to give Pers-463 direction for the detailers when
obligating TEMDUINS funds. The guidelines have been kept
broad so as not to be restrictive. While this approach has
provided the detailers with flexibility in order-writing,




4 . Reports and Evaluation
Both Pers-02 and Pers-463 track TEMDUINS execution
through a number of reports. Data is received from Navy
Finance and Accounting Activity (NFAA) , Cleveland, reflecting
month end information. Near the end of the year, or when
funds seems perilously low, the reports are provided weekly.
The number of counts (orders) written and associated dollars
are provided with the information broken out by officers and
enlisted personnel, obligations and expenditures.
Pers-463 also receives additional detailed reports
from NFAA weekly which identifies TEMDUINS obligations in yet
greater detail. The report shows counts and fund obligations
by quarter for officers and enlisted personnel. But, due to
the differing dates of computer runs to generate the reports,
the two NFAA reports cannot be correlated.
Pers-02 is required by NAVCOMPT to report monthly on
the financial status of its subordinate activities and
programs. NAVCOMPT' s interest is chiefly in the amount of
funds currently obligated and expended. This information is
compared to estimated obligation rates provided by the
claimant in the annual budget submission.
BUPERS and NAVCOMPT evaluate the execution of its
subordinate activities and programs for two purposes: to
ensure that use of available funds is maximized and to watch
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for potential legal violations. The TEMDUINS program is often
at a disadvantage in this type of evaluation. As discussed
previously, it may take several months before a service
member's PCS orders citing a TEMDUINS fund obligation are
liquidated. This gives the program a poor expenditure rate,
making it appear that funds are possibly being used
ineffectively. Also, because of the delay in expenditures and
the difficulty in accurately estimating the final per diem
expense, it is hard to monitor TEMDUINS legal viability.
The primary means of monitoring TEMDUINS is through
the number of personnel trained, a process measure. Even this
is an unreliable measure, however, as the number can be
affected if TEMDUINS -supported PCS orders are slowed or
stopped. This situation has occurred in the past when
Military Pay, Navy (MPN) funds have been insufficient for the
planned number of PCS moves. As PCS orders provide the
transportation for TEMDUINS, any change to PCS orders directly
impacts TEMDUINS execution.
D. SUMMARY
TEMDUINS program management currently embraces a portion
of each aspect of the management control theory defined above.
Programming is done through the POM process but Anthony and
Young's second cycle, long range planning, is not evident
[Ref . 44 :p. 15] . Also, the Navy's mid- level management is not
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especially involved with TEMDUINS programming as the theory-
would expect [Ref . 43 :p. 424] . This is in direct contrast to
the TDY en route programming done by the other services where
field personnel input is solicited to take advantage of their
operational knowledge and personal experience in establishing
the program's long range needs.
Not all facets of the budgeting management control theory
are applicable to TEMDUINS. While it is crucial to involve
lower managers in building most budgets to gain their
commitment to attain the defined objectives, commitment from
the TEMDUINS "lower managers" (i.e., Pers - 02 ' s TEMDUINS Budget
Analyst, Per-463 and the Pers-4 assignment personnel) will not
ensure budget success. This is because training requirements
are driven by upper management in the form of the Navy Warfare
Coordinators (OP- 02, OP- 03 and OP- 05) . Such a situation makes
it difficult to use the budget as a bilateral commitment
between the TEMDUINS Program Manager (Pers -2 03) and their
fiscal superior, the TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor (OP- 120) , as
Anthony and Young suggest [Ref. 44 :p. 90]
.
Anthony has suggested that during execution, the budget is
only a guide for the manager and deviations should be made as
conditions warrant [Ref. 40:p. 93]. Regrettably, Pers-02 and
Pers -463 haven't much flexibility in making deviations for
TEMDUINS' execution as they have little control over which
courses are funded by the detailers for which personnel
assignments. Without an explicit plan for total Navy TEMDUINS
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training requirements, they cannot effect quick adjustments to
expenditures based on changes in the Navy's operational
commitments. While the TEMDUINS Program Manager does provide
execution guidance to assist Pers-02 and Pers-463, the
direction is rather broad in scope. This again is due to the
lack of a precise program plan, delineating what training will
be needed on a priority basis.
Reports are used by Pers-02 and Pers-463 to track
obligations and expenditures to prevent fiscal overruns and
assure that available funding will carry the TEMDUINS program
through the fiscal year. While it is possible then to monitor
efficient use of funds, the Navy cannot be certain that
TEMDUINS funds have been used effectively. This is due to the
intangibility of the program's outputs, a problem common to
most nonprofit organizations [Ref. 45: 111-112]. The main
measure used now in evaluating TEMDUINS' success for any given
year is a performance measure: the number of personnel who
received per diem under the program in a fiscal year. To
better monitor the program's effectiveness, it might be
helpful to adopt a surrogate results measure such as the
number of personnel who earned an NEC or similar accreditation
in a fiscal year.
99
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to examine how the Navy-
plans, programs and budgets for its training conducted en
route between permanent duty stations through its TEMDUINS
program. The DoD's current fiscal environment was discussed
with emphasis placed on the Military Personnel and Operations
and Maintenance appropriations. This data underscored the
need to attain the maximum economy during an era of
diminishing defense budgets. The roles and responsibilities
of the Navy offices impacting the TEMDUINS program were
identified and discussed. For comparative purposes, similar
Army, Air Force and Marine Corps training- en- route programs
were researched. Finally, TEMDUINS programming, budgeting,
execution and evaluation techniques were contrasted with
operating budget activity management control systems as an
objective means of performance measurement. This chapter will
correlate the above information in a final assessment of the
TEMDUINS program fiscal management.
Before addressing the conclusions reached, it would be
useful to review the research questions for this thesis. The
primary focus of this thesis was to examine how the Navy and
its sister services plan, program, budget and execute funding
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to support en route TDY training. Additional questions to be
addressed were:
• What factors relating to en route TDY training are common
to all four services and which are unique?
• How do the respective services program for this type of
training in the POM process?
• How are new en route TDY training requirements (i.e.,
those related to an equipment modification or acquisition)
programmed and funded by the services?
• To what level does each service delegate budgeting for
this category of training?
• Are specialized computer or management control systems
used by the services in planning for en route TDY
training?
• What controls are exercised by the services to maximize
the use of funds during the execution year?
• What are the services' respective management policies
towards this type of training?
The following sections consolidate the answers found to these
questions.
1. Lessons the Navy Can Learn From the Other Services
There are four major lessons the Navy can learn from
how the other services manage their TDY- en- route training.
The first lesson is that a macro- level data base appears to be
the most effective way to predict training needs and manage
the program. Specific examples for the Navy to consider are
the Army's ATRRS and Air Force's TMS systems. Discussions
with Army staff members indicates there is a possibility for
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other DoD components to "buy into" the ATRRS system [Ref . 23] .
This presents a distinct advantage to the Navy as it would
have the opportunity to use a proven, functioning system
without paying for development or start-up costs.
Second, only the Navy has its assignment personnel
manage training allotment based on available training
(TEMDUINS) dollars. The other three services "buy" training
quotas with the TDY- en- route resources, and these quotas are
passed to the assignment personnel for use in writing PCS
orders. Execution year dollar changes are then made by
adjusting the number of quotas a detailer has access to. This
technique seems to be a more effective budgeting tool as the
TDY- en- route budgeting office retains stronger control of the
dollars and can impact funding increases or decreases quickly.
Another advantage to this approach is that it frees the
detailers from the administrative burden of managing a
"checkbook" for training dollars.
Third, the other three services have some type of
training prioritization in place to maximize the use of
training funds and ensure that training deemed most critical
takes precedence. The Army and Marine Corps training
priorities are largely driven by mission needs, and the Air
Force gives first priority to Air Force-directed and
contractor-provided training. The Navy, however, has yet to
have an agreement reached between the Program Warfare
Coordinators and OP- 01 for any type training prioritization.
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Considering the Navy's decreasing budget profile, it will
become increasingly important for the Navy to identify a
ranking process for training requirements to ensure the most
critical needs are met first.
Fourth, the other services involve their field
activities in identifying current and upcoming training
requirements. This feedback, after headquarters review and
consolidation, becomes the basis for programming and budgeting
their respective training en route programs. There is one
disadvantage is this process in that some "gold-plating"
(requesting non-essential training) has occurred which falsely
inflates the projected requirements. But, the other services
seem to find that this disadvantage is more than offset by the
field- level input of what training is actually best for the
mission vice what a higher- level command might perceive is
required. Additional savings have been found where
subordinate activities have suggested the reduction or
deletion of courses. The Navy has yet to adopt this approach
as training requirements are still developed at OPNAV in
Washington.
2. Similarities and Differences Between the Services'
Programs
a. Common Factors
The comparison between the services' training en
route programs has revealed several similarities. Common to
103
all of them is that training requirements typically exceed the
resources available. This situation was noted irrespective of
how the training requirements were identified, either by the
headquarters or field activities. Even with exacting review
processes, such as those used by the Army and Air Force,
training needs still were greater that the designated funding.
This phenomenon emphasizes the need for quota prioritization
to guarantee that the most critical needs are met.
The four services all appear to experience some
difficulty in overestimating training requirements. While the
Navy's estimates are based on available historical data and
information identified in the NTPs, the lack of a training
data base precludes verification of the estimates. The
Navy's sister services have recognized this problem and have
their respective training requirements development systems
(Army's Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR) , the Air
Force's Training Management System (TMS) and the Marine Corps
Headquarter' s Training Input Plan (TIP)) serve in part as a
screening process to filter out extraneous training requests.
The military services also must modify their
training en route programs to reflect budget reductions. The
Army, Air Force and Marine Corps translate the dollar loss
into quotas lost and adjust the number of quotas available to
the assignment personnel. The Navy implements TEMDUINS cuts
by directly reducing the dollars available to the detailers.
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b . Differences
The Army's ATRRS system is unique compared to those
used by the other services. An extremely powerful and
interactive data base, it encompasses several management
functions in one system: programming, planning, execution and
individual training records for Army personnel . ATRRS and
Army training also have a high level of visibility relative to
other Army programs, a visibility that seems even higher
compared to the other service's TDY en route programs. The
Army's perceived importance of TDY en route training is
evidenced by conflict resolution taken to the "Council of
Colonels," with subsequent evaluation by the General Officer
Review.
The Air Force has explicitly defined its training
priorities and made them policy through Air Force Regulation
50-22 [Ref . 26] which lends stability to their program, budget
and execution plans for TDY- to- School . The Marines and Air
Force go through an iterative process to determine the
training priority for a given year. Again, the Navy assigns
no priorities to its training program.
The Air Force has undertaken an initiative not yet
attempted by the other services in that training quotas and
dollars available after prioritized needs are met are
apportioned out to the MAJCOMS. Further, the MAJCOMS are
allowed to directly fund desired TDY-en- route training
requirements in excess of their allotted quotas. This is an
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interesting endeavor as it both maximizes the use of available
training assets but also removes TDY en route funds from the
economic public good category as the MAJCOM' s must now pay for
any additional training they desire.
The Marines have found a way to employ existing
government accounting systems as a control mechanism for their
TDY en route program. Course -unique accounting data
identified in the TQM (Training Quota Memorandum) allows the
Corps to use standard accounting reports to monitor the
obligation and expenditure of their training dollars.
3. TDY-en-Route and the POM Process
The Army takes the data collected through its SMDR as
the basis for the POM submission. The Marine Corps operates
in a similar manner where the TIP is also their training
program's POM foundation. The Air Force employs its TDY-to-
School Programming Plan (TSPP) as both the core of its
training requirements definition process and its program's
POM. The Navy, on the other hand, incorporates training-
related information gleaned from the NTPs into its TEMDUINS'
POM submission. Compared to the other services, this is a far
less accurate method. Only those NTPs seen by the TEMDUINS
Program Manager can be reflected in the POM and even this is
contingent upon when the NTPs are received in the POM process.
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4. Delegation of Budget Authority-
All four services currently hold budget authority for
their TDY en route programs at the headquarters level . The
common reason for this decision appears to be increased
management control to prevent any legal violation relating to
overobligation or misuse of appropriated funds. The Air
Force, however, is considering decentralizing their TDY-to-
School program, passing all training funds and
responsibilities down to the MAJCOMs [Ref. 35].
5. Computer and Management Control Systems
The Army and Air Force employ extremely large and
complex computer database systems (ATRRS and TMS,
respectively) to manage their TDY en route programs. The
Marine Corps TIP, although not automated, serves a similar
purpose in defining Marine Corps training needs. The Navy
presently has no formal management control or computer support
system for TEMDUINS, relying instead on close interaction
between the program's Resource Sponsor, Program Manager,
Claimant and Execution Office.
6 . Execution Year Controls
During the budget execution year, TEMDUINS obligations
and expenditures are monitored by the program' s Financial
Execution Branch (Pers-463) and the BUPERS Comptroller (Pers-
02) on a monthly basis early in the fiscal year and weekly as
the year draws to a close or funding is limited. The actual
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execution data is compared to monthly estimates developed
during the budget process. Deviations are managed on an
exception basis.
The Marine Corps manages the execution year of their
respective program in a similar manner. Government accounting
reports vice internal reports are used to analyze actual
obligations and expenditures. This capability is due to the
Corps adaption of course-unique accounting data.
The Army also monitors execution year actions, making
most of its adjustments through the TRAP (Training
Requirements Arbitration Panel) . The TRAP reviews
transactions such as training increases, reductions, trades
and execution problems. The goal is to reconcile differences
by making trade offs or absorbing shortages.
During the execution year, the Air Force first ensures
its top two training priorities, Air Force-directed and
contractor-provided training, are met. The remaining training
requirements are decremented to offset any shortages that
exist in satisfying these priorities. Should the Air Force
MAJCOMs have unfunded training requirements, they are
permitted to provide funding specific for that training.
7. Management Policies
As mentioned previously, all four services presently
have adopted a centralized management style for their
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respective TDY en route programs. Yet beyond that, some
services have defined additional training management policies.
The Army has established that training is the number
one priority for their service. The Air Force's stated policy
is that Air Force-directed and contractor-provided instruction
will take precedence over all other requirements. The Marine
Corps and Navy both strongly support training but have not
promulgated any additional management objectives.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the above conclusions, the following are both
immediate and long-term recommendations for the Navy to
consider for the TEMDUINS program.
1. Short-Term Recommendations
The first recommendation the Navy could quickly adopt
is prioritizing its training requirements as the other
services do. Prioritization should first be done for the
budget execution year and then, as a long-term goal, extended
through all POM years. Without the ability to rank
requirements, it will be difficult for the Navy to ensure that
the most essential training is provided before other
requirements in a fiscal year. This will become an
increasingly critical factor as the current defense budget
shows the Navy's funding continuing to decrease.
Second, the Navy should examine the adoption of a
system similar to that used by the Marine Corps where the
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accounting data is unique for each course funded. Due to the
large number and variety of courses attended by naval
personnel, this concept would have to be slightly adjusted.
For example, the accounting data for enlisted personnel could
be adjusted by one or two characters to differentiate between
aviation, surface warfare, submarine or general shore duty
training. Similar changes could be made for officer
accounting data. This would allow the Navy to quickly monitor
TEMDUINS obligations and expenditures without the need for the
development of additional reports by using standard government
accounting reports.
2. Long-Term Recommendations
The Navy's first long term goal for TEMDUINS should be
to establish a computerized database system to aid in the
management, programming, budgeting and execution of the
program. While Pers-02 and Pers-463 do monitor TEMDUINS
closely and track the available historical data, these efforts
simply do not compare with the extensive computerized systems
used by the Army and Air Force. The automated systems the
other services employ have several distinct advantages; not
only is background data readily available for analysis, but
the process used to automate the information serves as a
control measure for training requests submitted. Whatever
system the Navy adopts, it must be flexible so as to capture
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standard training plus atypical situations such as homeport
training and service member cross- training.
Research has found that some equipment and hardware
modifications, especially those giving the contractor
flexibility in acquisition or design, are not fully reflected
in the respective NTP. While the Navy's training facilities
may recognize the anomalies and lengthen or establish a new
school, these adjustments directly affect TEMDUINS' per diem
requirements. If the information is not in the NTP, the
TEMDUINS Program Manager has no knowledge that additional
funding requirements exist.
It is recommended that the Navy Warfare Coordinators
and/or the cognizant Acquisition Offices periodically
correlate the current or proposed NTP with the respective
contract to identify areas which could result in additional
training requirements already recognized in the NTP. Specific
attention should be given to allowances for Government
Furnished Equipment or Form- Fit -Function contracts.
Next, consideration should be given to the impact NTP
training requirements have on the TEMDUINS program. Several
Navy offices directly affect TEMDUINS' funding through the NTP
process. Yet, there is no motivation for these parties to
ensure that their requirements are identified in the TEMDUINS
POM submission and are funded. The non- availability of funds
has yet to be a deterrent to the approval of an NTP, with the
implication being that somehow the budget process "will
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provide." Instead, NTP requirements which have not been
funded through the budget or POM process should be returned to
the originator, either for funding support or reconsideration.
Funding support could be direct, in the form of transferring
dollars into the TEMDUINS account to fund the requirement, or
indirect, by aiding the TEMDUINS Resource Sponsor and Program
Manager in a funding campaign to NAVCOMPT.
As a continuation of the above recommendation, it is
also suggested that NAVCOMPT reconsider its refusal to allow
the Warfare Sponsors to contribute to the TEMDUINS program to
support training requirements which exceed the program's
available resources. While OP- 01 is responsible for the
TEMDUINS program, the current system is not economically sound
as the Warfare Coordinators may identify requirements which
are unrealistic given the Navy's current fiscal environment.
One possibility is to do major funding transfers during the
POM, while another is to deal with the additional training
requirements on a case-by- case basis. Following the Air
Force's example, the Navy could allow the Navy Warfare
Coordinators to individually fund excess training
requirements. Research noted that the Warfare Coordinators
already do this unofficially. Formalizing the process as the
Air Force does would still allow the training requirements to
be monitored to build the TEMDUINS data base and support
future year projections.
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Unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy does not have
an interactive process to identify training requirements
perceived at all levels of the Navy. Presently, the Navy's
primary means of isolating requirements is through the NTP
process. Even this communication is only "one way" as the
Warfare Coordinators provide input to OP- 01 but receive no
feedback.
Consideration should be given to implementing an
interactive training forum in the Navy as the means to
building TEMDUINS requirements. Such a program would have
several benefits. It would reduce infighting between OPNAV
offices and refocus efforts on a common goal of service to the
fleet. Also, actual "hands on" users' contributions to the
process could result in more relevant training being provided
and reveal courses for deletion, streamlining or modification.
While this is ambitious, a beginning could be made on a
smaller scale with quarterly meetings between the Warfare
Coordinators and the TEMDUINS team. The next evolutionary
step could be to include the 26 Navy claimants.
There is now no way to program TEMDUINS training costs
as a portion of a major acquisition program, due to the
difference in appropriations. Even now when the NTP for a
major project is submitted to Pers-203 and subsequently
incorporated and funded in the POM, the separation between the
acquisition and the TEMDUINS funding weakens the link. The
resulting lack of viability makes it difficult to show the
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impact TEMDUINS budget cuts may have on significant future
requirements
.
Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to this
problem. Current laws prohibit supporting routine training
with other than O&M funds. If provisions were made for this
type of training under acquisition or other appropriations,
administration of the TEMDUINS program would become a
nightmare. If the funds were originally plugged into the
acquisition funds and then reprogrammed into TEMDUINS as O&M,
things would work fine until the acquisition project slipped
fiscal years. The result would be that the associated O&M
funds would expire for obligation before training could be
provided. The best option is to develop a system like the
Army or Air Force where quotas are individually "bought" and
requirements can be closely tracked.
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